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Abstract
Building on a comprehensive data set containing financial data on Norwegian companies
from 2004 to 2016 combined with a database on all individuals holding directorships in the
same period, this thesis investigates the level of director compensation in the Norwegian
business environment. We draw upon agency theory, resource dependence theory and
related literature to construct an extensive research model including firm characteristics,
corporate performance, board characteristics, ownership structure, and gender diversity.
We control for unobserved heterogeneity by employing a two-way fixed eﬀects model, and
detect a positive relationship between the level of director compensation and a firm’s
complexity. Moreover, our evidence suggest the relationship is negative for a firm’s leverage
ratio as well as the size of the board. Lastly, we provide novel evidence of a positive
relationship between holding multiple directorships and the level of compensation.
However, we are not able to identify any significant relationship between the level of director
compensation and a firm’s performance, a well-documented relationship internationally.
Neither do we find evidence of gender diversity of the board and management to aﬀect
director compensation over the sample period, but some weak evidence of a positive
relationship before the introduction of a gender quota on boards in 2008.
Keywords – Director Compensation, Corporate Governance, Agency Theory, Resource
Dependence Theory
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11 Introduction
Director compensation is a matter of continual debate in Norway as boards are experiencing
increasing demands from national and international regulations. Directors of listed
companies in Norway report that they spend 30% of a full-time-equivalent (FTE) on their
duties on average, but that the workload can increase to 50-60% in busy periods. Still,
director compensation is only a mere 5-10% of CEO compensation. An analysis by The
Norwegian Institute of Directors1 documents a 35% increase in CEO compensation for
eight of the biggest listed companies in Norway over the last five years, whereas director
compensation only increased by 18% (Hindar and Brækken, 2019). This disproportionate
growth encourages research into the determinants of director compensation in Norway.
The compensation to a company’s board of directors is determined by the general assembly,
according to Norwegian law (Aksjeloven, 1997; Allmennaksjeloven, 1997). The law
elaborates no further on the setting of this compensation, implying considerable flexibility
concerning what aspects to consider in the decision-making process. Consequently, this
critical aspect of corporate governance is somewhat of a black box to most of the population.
We seek to explore this black box in an attempt to explain what determines the level
of director compensation in the Norwegian business environment. Do larger companies
pay higher compensation? Is the remuneration contingent on corporate performance? Or
can increased gender diversity on the board aﬀect compensation levels? These are the
types of questions we attempt to answer in this thesis, leading us to the following research
question:
What determines the level of director compensation in Norwegian companies?
The development of director compensation over recent years enhances the need for a
deep-dive into this particular topic. Figure 1.1 illustrates the findings of the Norwegian
Board Compensation Survey for the period 2010 to 2018.2 As the survey is conducted on
listed and state-owned companies while we include a more extensive range of companies
in our study, it is not the sheer magnitude of the numbers, but rather the development
of these numbers that arouses curiosity. It is particularly interesting to see the sharp
1The Norwegian Institute of Directors (Styreinstituttet) is Norway’s only network for members of
boards and election committees in Norwegian listed and state-owned companies.
2The Norwegian Institute Directors provide us with the reports over the entire period
2distinction in compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for the periods of 2010 to 2014
and 2015 to 2018. This drop may partly be due to the oil price fall commencing in 2014.
However, this thesis seeks to analyze what other factors aﬀect the board compensation
and thus could explain the drop.
Figure 1.1: Norwegian Institute of Directors’ Board Compensation Survey
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the determinants of directors’ remuneration in the
Norwegian business environment. A natural starting point in exploring these determinants
is an investigation of what the compensation intends to reflect. The Norwegian Corporate
Governance Board3 (NUES ) issues the recommendation on corporate governance for
companies listed in Norway in its Code of Practice. The Norwegian Code of Practice
for Corporate Governance section on the remuneration of the board of directors (The
Norwegian Corporate Governance Board, 2018, p. 45) states:
The remuneration of the board of directors should reflect the board’s responsibility, expertise,
time commitment, and the complexity of the company’s activities. The remuneration of
the board of directors should not be linked to the company’s performance. The company
should not grant share options to members of its board.
3Norwegian Institute of Public Accountants, Finance Norway, Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise
(NHO) and Oslo Stock Exchange are among the eight members constituting this board. The board’s
recommendations are held in high regard, exemplified by the Norwegian government developing corporate
governance principles for government- and government-owned organizations in line with these.
3It is noteworthy that the oﬃcial guideline for Norwegian companies recommends
remuneration to be set independently of the company’s performance when there is
extensive international research linking director compensation to company performance
(e.g. Brick et al., 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Andreas et al., 2010). It does not,
however, implicate that performance is irrelevant in setting directors’ remuneration for
Norwegian companies, but The Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (2018) warns of
incentive-based programs’ weakening eﬀect on the board’s independence. Although the
compensation might be 100% cash, it is plausible that after a year of excellent performance,
the compensation to the board will increase.
The existence of a relationship between corporate performance and directors’ remuneration
is further supported by the ongoing debate in Norwegian media, in particular, Dagens
Næringsliv.4 The debate emerged as a consequence of the publication of a BCG5 report
commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries which found
that chairpersons and board members spent 30% and 20%, respectively, of an FTE on
work related to their directorships. An open letter from the heads of the Nomination
committees of four of the largest listed companies further fueled the debate. They called
for competitive director remuneration in Norwegian companies6. The letter stated that the
compensation to a chairperson of an OSEBX-listed company is half of what a comparable
directorship pays in Sweden and only a third in Denmark.
The demand for competitive compensation combined with the notion of a market for
directors, implies that suﬃcient remuneration is required to attract the best talent. Hence,
there is an implicit assumption of a relationship between corporate performance and the
remuneration of the board. This relationship is well-documented in existing research (e.g.
Brick et al., 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Andreas et al., 2010). Hence, we will analyze
the relationship between corporate performance and director remuneration. Furthermore,
we analyze several other aspects of both the company and the board likely to aﬀect the
compensation of the board. We will present these in the following.
According to NUES’ recommendation, as quoted earlier, the remuneration should reflect
4Dagens Næringsliv is the largest business newspaper in Norway and is published daily.
5BCG (Boston Consulting Group) is an international management consulting firm present in more
than 50 countries.
6The letter is available here: https://www.dn.no/innlegg/vi-trenger-konkurransedyktige-
styrehonorarer/2-1-636816
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the complexity of the company’s activities. A firm’s complexity is a somewhat abstract
feature and requires proxies in order to estimate. In the existing literature, firm size,
R&D, and incurred risk are all used as proxies for firm complexity (e.g. Bryan et al., 2000;
Brick et al., 2006; Linn and Park, 2005). Consequently, we view Firm Characteristics as
another dimension presumed to aﬀect the level of director compensation. Moreover, the
remuneration should reflect the board’s expertise leading us to include the dimension of
Board Characteristics.
In addition to the three dimensions mentioned above, Andreas et al. (2010) studies the
relationship between ownership structure as a central governing mechanism and the
remuneration of the board of directors. Therefore, we include Ownership Structure as one
of our dimensions.
Ultimately, there is much media focus and existing literature on the diversity of
management and directors, in particular with regard to gender diversity (e.g. Adams and
Ferreira, 2009). Female representation on boards has received increasing attention in
recent years supported by new legislation and campaigns such as 2020 Women On Boards.7
Therefore, our fifth and last dimension of director remuneration is Gender Diversity.
1.1 Structure
We structure the thesis in the following manner. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the
theories applied in our analysis and discussion, entailed by a presentation of the literature
on this topic and identification of a research gap. Chapter 3 is concerned with hypothesis
development based on the literature presented in Chapter 2. Following this, Chapter 4
presents the data providing the foundation for our thesis. We elaborate on the origin
of our data, and the processes undertaken in order to construct our final data set. This
chapter concludes with a presentation of the variables included in the study. Chapter
5 outlines our methodological approach. In Chapter 6, we present our empirical results
before we discuss the findings in light of applied theory and findings of existing literature
in Chapter 7. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the findings of our study, and we present our
suggestions for future research.
72020 Women On Boards is a global education, public awareness, and advocacy campaign urging
corporations to meet or exceed 20% women directors on their boards by the year 2020. Read more here:
https://2020wob.com
52 Background and Literature
In this chapter, we will shortly introduce the regulations of the board of directors in
Norway and in the countries in which related literature is undertaken. Secondly, we
explain the theory constituting the foundation for the development of our hypotheses, and
later, our analysis and discussion. Furthermore, we will present the reviewed literature on
this particular topic and elaborate on the identified research gap providing the basis of
our thesis.
2.1 Regulatory Diﬀerences
In Norway, the general assembly elects the board of directors to administer the relationship
between shareholders and management, according to chapter 6 of the Norwegian Act on
Private Limited Liability Companies and the Norwegian Act on Public Limited Liability
Companies (Aksjeloven, 1997; Allmennaksjeloven, 1997). This way of organizing the
company creates a three-level hierarchy of shareholders, directors, and management. The
management is tasked with the day-to-day running of the business, while the board
shall ensure proper organization of the company as well as monitor the management
and company in general (Aksjeloven, 1997; Allmennaksjeloven, 1997). The regulation
of private limited companies is largely similar to that of public limited companies. A
significant diﬀerence, however, is the mandatory requirement of both genders to be
represented by at least 40% for public limited companies. Both corporation types require
a corporate assembly if the number of employees exceeds 200, and this assembly is tasked
with the appointment of the board members as well as monitoring the board and CEO’s
management of the company (Allmennaksjeloven, 1997).
The ten reviewed studies are conducted in the US, UK, India, and Germany, with diﬀering
corporate governance structures to the Norwegian setting. In the first three countries, the
Anglo-Saxon model with a one-tier board system is prevalent, whereas the two-tier board
system is the standard in Germany (Tripathi, 2013). The Norwegian model is similar to
the Anglo-Saxon for most companies, but when the number of employees exceeds 200, the
corporate assembly is introduced, and the model is largely similar to the two-tier system.
In the two-tier system, there is a clear segregation of the supervisory and monitoring
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functions and the management functions by organizing one Supervisory Board and one
Management Board (Hopt and Leyens, 2004). Of the two, the supervisory board is more
similar to the board structure required by Norwegian law and the Anglo-Saxon model,
which is also the board of which we study the director compensation. Therefore, we focus
on the results concerning the supervisory boards when reviewing German studies.
To study the three-level hierarchy of shareholders, directors, and management, we draw
upon agency theory and resource dependence theory.
2.2 Theory
Agency theory is concerned with resolving the problems which might occur in agency
relationships. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract
under which one or more individuals (the principal(s)) engage another individual (the
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-
making authority to the agent. They further claim that if both parties to the relationship
are seeking to maximize utility, it is reasonable to believe that the agent will not act in the
best interest of the principal at all times. Eisenhardt (1989) builds upon this definition
and defines two problems that can occur in such a relationship. The first is the agency
problem that arises when the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict, and it is
diﬃcult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is doing. The second is the
problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have diﬀerent attitudes
toward risk, causing the principal and the agent to have diﬀerent preferred actions.
Agency theory is most common in addressing the relationship between shareholders and
management, and how to incentivize the management (the agent) to act in the best
interest of the shareholders (the principal). Jensen (1986) argues that the board is not
necessarily provided with proper incentives to take actions that create eﬃciency and value
for the company. Hence, agency problems can occur between shareholders and directors as
well. In other words, the three-level hierarchy of shareholders, directors, and management
intended to mitigate agency problems may generate agency problems of its own (Kumar
and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) view, in line with the resource dependence theory, boards
as a provider of resources, e.g., legitimacy, links to other organizations, advice, and
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counsel. The research exploring boards and firm performance is primarily concerned
about board capital, which consists of human capital and social capital (Hillman and
Dalziel, 2003). Smith (1776) defined human capital as "the acquired and useful abilities
of all the inhabitants or members of the society." The human capital of the board is the
expertise and experience of the directors emphasized in the NUES recommendation quoted
earlier. Social capital is defined as the aggregate of resources embedded within, available
through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or
an organization (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Resource dependence theory assumes that
corporations depend upon one another for access to valuable resources and therefore seek
to establish links in an attempt to regulate their interdependence (Hung, 1998).
The research undertaken in this paper is mainly based on the agency theory, but for some
specific variables, the resource dependence theory will provide the fundamental reasoning.
2.3 Reviewed Literature
The modern research on director compensation started in parallel with the emergence and
acceptance of the modern agency theory in the late 1970s (Mitnick, 2019). In the aftermath
of this emergence, scholars have performed extensive research on this particular topic.
Most research has tried to identify how the structure and level of board compensation are
related to the diﬀerent aspects of firm- and board characteristics. We review ten empirical
studies using director compensation as their dependent variable and present an overview
of the empirical conclusions drawn in the related literature in this section. Appendix A3.1
introduces each of the reviewed studies in detail, while their relevance is discussed in the
Hypothesis Development section.
2.3.1 Firm Characteristics
The literature suggests that the board of directors is appointed on behalf of the shareholders
to mitigate agency problems and that the level of board compensation should reflect
the degree to which agency costs exist. Bryan et al. (2000) argue that the probability
of agency conflicts occurring increases as the complexity of the firm increases. Other
scholars support this argument by documenting a positive relationship between the level
of director compensation and firm complexity, where complexity is proxied by firm size,
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investment opportunities, risk, and R&D to total assets (e.g. Ryan and Wiggins, 2004;
Brick et al., 2006; Linn and Park, 2005). Further, Jensen (1986) argues that agency
costs are a function of a firm’s capital structure and that debt can be interpreted as a
control mechanism itself. Thereby, by increasing debt, one would expect that the need
for monitoring by the board should decrease. This claim is consistent with the findings
of Andreas et al. (2010) when studying listed German companies. However, Bryan et al.
(2000) and Brick et al. (2006) found no significant relation between board compensation
and leverage, suggesting that the disciplinary role of debt is not as prominent as posited
by Jensen (1986).
2.3.2 Corporate Performance
Agency theory advocates the alignment of interests between shareholders and the board
of directors by linking corporate performance to the remuneration. Most of the conducted
research provides evidence of a significant and positive relationship across a broad range of
accounting- and market-based measures (e.g. Ghosh, 2006; Andreas et al., 2010). However,
Conyon (1997) and Elston and Goldberg (2003) document no significant relationship
between the two.
2.3.3 Board Characteristics
The literature is divided concerning its conclusions on how board compensation is related to
various board characteristics. Scholars have used proxies such as board size, CEO duality,
number of meetings, and age to study the board’s monitoring eﬀectiveness and abilities.
Research on the relationship between board size and compensation provides mixed results.
Some scholars argue that a larger board will increase monitoring eﬀectiveness by having
more people reviewing management actions and by providing more resources to the board
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Ghosh, 2006). Meanwhile, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) and
Andreas et al. (2010) document an inverse relationship between board compensation and
board size, proposing that the board’s monitoring abilities get less eﬃcient with increased
size.
Agency theory argues that CEO duality reduces monitoring eﬀectiveness by promoting
managerial entrenchment and thus should the relationship with board compensation be
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inverse. However, Brick et al. (2006) found that board compensation increases when the
same person holds the role of CEO and chairman. They posit that this may be the result
of an environment of weak governance in general. This positive relationship is endorsed
by Ghosh (2006) and Cook et al. (2019). On the contrary, Conyon (1997) and Ryan and
Wiggins (2004) found no significant relationship between the two.
Further, monitoring eﬀectiveness may be a function of the board’s human and social
capital. Cook et al. (2019) found a positive relationship between executive age and board
compensation, suggesting that more experienced directors are more eﬃcient monitors
and should receive compensation accordingly. Concerning the social capital, Andreas
et al. (2010) found no significant relationship between multiple directorships held and
compensation levels.
2.3.4 Ownership Structure
Elston and Goldberg (2003) found more dispersed ownership to make it harder for
the owners to monitor managerial activity and remove bad managers. Hence, more
concentrated ownership will reduce the need for eﬀective monitoring by the board as the
owners take on a monitoring role. This finding is also supported by Andreas et al. (2010)
and Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Elston and Goldberg (2003) further document a reduction
of board compensation when firms, foreign stakeholders, banks, or families possess block
ownerships as they often act as management monitors themselves.
Moreover, the extensive research of Gogineni et al. (2013) on the relationship between
ownership structure and agency costs suggests that the incentive for each shareholder
to incur all of the monitoring costs decreases as the number and type of shareholders
increase, providing a direct confirmation of the free-rider hypothesis. This is because the
complementary benefits of monitoring are limited and proportional to their ownership
stake. Further, they found that public firms experience higher agency costs when compared
to private firms.
2.3.5 Gender Diversity
The literature provides inconclusive results on the relationship between director
compensation and the fraction of females on the board. Adams and Ferreira (2009)
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argue that gender-diverse boards are more eﬃcient monitors than otherwise equal boards,
but provide inconclusive evidence on the significance of the relationship. Meanwhile,
Cook et al. (2019) documents a positive relationship between board compensation and
the fraction of female representatives. However, following the gender quota legislation in
Norway, Ahern and Dittmar (2011) found that female directors had less CEO experience
and were, on average, younger than their male co-directors. Thus, according to the
resource dependence theory, this should indicate an inverse relationship between increased
female representation and board compensation.
2.4 Existing Research Gap
The extensive research on director compensation has primarily been focusing on the
US, UK, and Germany. The research shows that the degree of complexity concerning
board structures and compensation contracts are very diﬀerent between these countries.
These international diﬀerences encourage further research on diﬀerent environments.
Our research seeks to fill this research gap by comprehensively analyzing the various
determinants of director compensation in the Norwegian business environment.
Research limitations on director compensation are often presumed to be caused by limited
data availability. Most of the related research focuses on listed firms or carefully selected
firms within the country of interest. By combining one of the most extensive databases
on accounting, enterprise, and industry information for all private and public companies
in Norway with a database containing information on all individuals engaged in a formal
role in these companies, we perform comprehensive analyses on a representative share of
small-, medium-, and large-sized companies in the economy. Our sample includes both
listed and unlisted companies within a broad range of industries and regions in Norway.
The only comparable study on Norwegian companies, to our knowledge, is Olsen and
Øien (2009), which analyzed board compensation and firm performance from 1992 to
2005. We extend this research in several ways. Firstly, in terms of the number and time
of the observations. Secondly, we include the momentous events of the financial crisis
of 2008 and the oil-price fall commencing in 2014. The period we study also includes
the introduction of a gender quota on the board for publicly listed companies. This law
provides a natural experiment with regard to the eﬀect of gender diversity on director
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compensation. Therefore, we conduct a subsidiary analysis on the period before and after
the introduction.
Moreover, we draw upon international research to construct a more comprehensive research
model, including five dimensions of determinants. The determinants primarily stem from
agency theory, following most of the related literature. Similar to existing research, we
believe agency theory to be the most fitting theory in explaining director compensation.
We do, however, include the resource dependence theory for some specific variables in line
with Andreas et al. (2010).
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3 Testable Hypotheses
This section describes the development of our hypotheses according to our research model
in 3.1. Our research model includes the five dimensions Firm Characteristics, Corporate
Performance, Board Characteristics, Ownership Structure, and Gender Diversity. By
combining this framework with the economic literature, we construct eight hypotheses
that we seek to answer in our analysis section. The hypotheses project the relationship
between our dependent variable, the average director compensation in a given company,
and variables proxying the abovementioned dimensions.
Figure 3.1: Research Model
Figure 3.1 presents the dimensions and respective variables used in the analysis.
3.1 Firm Characteristics
Standard agency models suggest that director compensation is structured to overcome
agency problems, i.e., the board of directors is appointed on behalf of the shareholders to
mitigate agency problems. Accordingly, we expect to see a correlation between director
compensation and the extent to which agency problems exist (Andreas et al., 2010).
Adopting this conceptual approach, we argue that firm complexity increases the need for
monitoring and the diﬃculty of board members’ responsibilities. Business complexity
is considered one of the key challenges in the 21st century as a result of increased
global expansion, the fast pace of technological developments, and the demand for highly
specialized skills (Queen and Fasipe, 2015). Thus, we predict that firm complexity is
positively related to the level of director compensation as it is presumed to increase agency
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problems.
Previous studies have used firm size, product and geographical diversification, intangible
assets to total assets, and incurred risk as proxies for firm complexity (e.g., Bryan et al.,
2000; Brick et al., 2006; Linn and Park, 2005). Following previous literature, we employ
firm size and risk as proxies for firm complexity. Based on the discussion above, we
construct our first null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Firm complexity and the level of director compensation are positively related
Most empirical findings in the related research support the relationship posited in H1. All
reviewed studies report a positive relationship between firm size and the level of director
compensation. This is consistent regardless of whether you use sales (e.g. Adams and
Ferreira, 2009), number of employees (e.g. Brick et al., 2006) or total assets (e.g. Linn and
Park, 2005) as a proxy for firm size. Conversely, the literature provides inconclusive results
for the relationship between risk and total compensation (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009).
Related literature measures a firm’s risk by market-based measures such as stock volatility
and beta, whereas we utilize the revised Z-Score introduced by Altman (2002), which is
an accounting-based measure of bankruptcy risk. To our knowledge, no related literature
has used this risk measure in their research. Thus, it will be particularly interesting to
analyze its eﬀect.
Further, Jensen (1986) argues that firms generating cash flows in excess of what is needed
to fund positive net present value projects face more significant agency problems as the
excess cash intensifies the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. The
argument is that managers increase their power by increasing the resources they have
control over. Thus are they incentivized to invest in projects even below their cost of
capital. Most related literature indicates a strong positive relationship between firm size
and management compensation (Lau and Vos, 2004), highlighting the increased incentives.
The conflict of interest is especially severe when the excess free cash flow is substantial.
The problem for the shareholders is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather
than wasting it on organization ineﬃciencies or investing it below its cost of capital
(Jensen, 1986).
By arguing that agency cost is a function of a firm’s capital structure, Jensen (1986)
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developed the well-known debt control hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that debt may
reduce agency costs by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of
managers. With debt working as its own control mechanism and acting as a substitute
monitoring device, we predict that the need for monitoring activity from the board will
decrease as leverage increases. Following previous research, we measure leverage by the
ratio of the book value of debt to total assets (e.g. Brick et al., 2006). Taken together,
the discussion above leads to our second null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The leverage ratio and the level of director compensation are negatively
related
The reviewed literature provides conflicting results regarding the relationship hypothesized
above. Andreas et al. (2010) found a significant negative relationship between leverage
and director compensation, bolstering the debt control hypothesis. Bryan et al. (2000)
also found a negative yet insignificant relationship in his study. On the contrary, Brick
et al. (2006) suggest that increased debt may increase the firm’s need for monitoring
as the equity is eroding when increasing leverage. Their pooled regression documents
a positive and significant relationship with cash compensation. However, they find no
significant relationship with total compensation. Given the contradicting results in the
related research, it will be interesting to analyze this hypothesis in a Norwegian setting.
3.2 Corporate Performance
Structuring contracts to align the interests of the agent with the interests of the principal
is paramount in agency theory, and the interests of the principal, i.e., the shareholders,
are commonly rooted in the company performing well. Assuming that the shareholders
prefer value maximization, there is an implicit assumption that better performance should
lead to better pay. However, as presented in the introduction, the Norwegian Corporate
Governance Board recommends separation of remuneration to the board and corporate
performance. Despite this separation, a firm performing well in one year will likely
increase the compensation in the ensuing year. Hence, although the compensation might
be 100% cash, we believe that the director compensation is positively related to corporate
performance, and posit:
Hypothesis 3: Corporate performance and the level of director compensation are positively
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related
The majority of the existing literature documents a positive, significant relationship
between both account- and market-based measures of corporate performance and the level
of director compensation (e.g., Ghosh, 2006; Andreas et al., 2010). Meanwhile, Conyon
(1997) and Elston and Goldberg (2003) find no significant relationship between corporate
performance and director compensation.
3.3 Board Characteristics
Boards diﬀer significantly concerning their monitoring eﬀort and abilities, enhancing
the need to analyze the composition of the boards. Drawing upon related literature,
we analyze diﬀerent aspects of the board presumed to influence the board’s monitoring
eﬀectiveness and, consequently, the compensation to the directors.
In the reviewed literature, there has been an extensive focus on board size as a determinant,
both in the agency-theory based and resource dependence-theory based literature. Kiel and
Nicholson (2003) argue that larger boards are beneficial from both theoretical perspectives.
They state that from the agency perspective, a larger board will be more vigilant for agency
problems as more people will review management actions. Meanwhile, from a resource
dependence theory perspective, a bigger board provides more links and hence, access to
resources. Both of these views argue that compensation should increase. However, we
believe the mechanical eﬀect of a larger board reducing the workload of each member
will be prominent, with an entailing reduction in compensation to each director, and
consequently, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: Board size and the level of director compensation are negatively related
Empirical findings on the linkage between board size and board compensation are
conflicting. Most studies find the relationship between board size and board compensation
to be significant and negative (e.g. Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
Andreas et al., 2010). However, Ghosh (2006) and Cook et al. (2019) found a positive
relationship between the two.
According to the Norwegian Private Limited Liability Company Act §6-13, the board shall
monitor the management, and up until 2013, it restricted the CEO from taking the role
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of chairperson of the board (Aksjeloven, 1997). The appointment of a single individual to
both these roles is known as CEO duality (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). In these situations,
the CEO has monitoring responsibilities over himself, and the board’s task of firing a
CEO when they see fit is accordingly more complicated. Agency theory argues that
CEO duality promotes managerial entrenchment by reducing monitoring eﬀectiveness.
Meanwhile, according to organization theory, duality establishes strong, unambiguous
leadership (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). However, we expect the predicted agency-
theory eﬀect will be dominant, in particular, due to the former regulation on this duality.
Consequently, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5: CEO duality and the level of compensation are negatively related
The theory is, as mentioned, split on the eﬀect of CEO duality, but the empirical findings
are uniform in its findings on the relationship being positive, although some document
insignificant coeﬃcients (e.g., Brick et al., 2006; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Ghosh, 2006;
Cook et al., 2019). Brick et al. (2006) argue that a higher level of compensation may
reflect an environment of weak governance.
In the view of resource dependence theory, the board of directors is a provider of resources,
including both social and human capital. Organizations value social capital because
director networks reduce uncertainty, provide access to information and opportunities,
and bring legitimacy and status to the organization (Cannella et al., 2009). Extensive
director networks are commonly acquired through interlocking directorships, i.e., the
social relationships created between two corporations when one person is a member of
both boards (Hung, 1998). Although the firm captures the value created through such
networks, the compensation of directors is expected to reflect some of this value.
However, theoretical views are conflicting. The main counterargument against these
networks is the fear of directors overstretching, and consequently, not being eﬀective
monitors on any boards (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). We assume the aspect of
overstretching to be less of a problem in our study as we include many smaller and
private companies with an entailing smaller workload. Conversely, Bøhren and Strøm
(2005) argue that the multiple directorships produce information networks whose value
more than oﬀsets the cost of having busy, overstretched directors, justifying higher board
compensation. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) define the board as being busy when the
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majority of the board hold three or more directorships. The Forbes 500 largest companies
of 1992 constitute their sample.8 Therefore, we deem it reasonable to increase this
threshold to five as we include many smaller companies with an entailing lower workload.
Hence, the threshold to characterize the board as busy should be higher. Setting the
threshold to five is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, but we deem it likely that it will
capture the eﬀect of information sharing between companies.
Hypothesis 6: Social capital and the level of director compensation are positively related
Belcredi and Bozzi (2018) studied Italian listed companies and found no significant
relationship between the number of directorships held and remuneration for non-executive
directors (NEDs). However, they found a positive, significant relationship for independent
non-executive directors (INEDs) (Belcredi and Bozzi, 2018).9 Conversely, Andreas et al.
(2010) found no significant relationship between the two.
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) advocate the view of the board as a provider of resources such
as advice and counsel, i.e., human capital. Common for most lines of work is to compensate
according to the human capital of the employee, and the NUES recommendation explicitly
states the compensation to reflect the board’s expertise. The human capital of a board
can be proxied by several diﬀerent measures, e.g., education, the number of years worked
in the industry in which the company operates, and tenure on the board. Common for
the two first alternatives is that the information is only available through surveys, which
would be too comprehensive in this study. Regarding the latter, we are provided with
data on all directorships between 1998 and 2016, but we have no data on the directors’
experience prior to 1998. This would cause a skew in the variable in favor of the latest
years - a board in 2016 would be more likely to have higher average tenure than a board
in 2004. Therefore, we proxy the human capital of the board by computing the average
age of the board members in the given year.
Hypothesis 7: Human capital and the level of director compensation are positively related
There is little existing research on the relationship between the human capital of the board
8Forbes 500 was an annual listing of the 500 largest US companies by Forbes magazine last issued in
2003. The list was calculated by combining five factors: sales, profits, assets, market value and employees.
9INEDs are NEDs who have no personal or business relationship with managers or large shareholders
in contrast to “gray” NEDs, who might have such relationships (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). In this
study, we do not make the distinction between these two types of directors, and therefore this eﬀect might
be mixed in the results.
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and the remuneration to the board, but Cook et al. (2019) found executive age to be
positively related to executive compensation. Proxying human capital by the average age
of the directors is admittedly a weak measure, but given the available data, we deem it
the most fitting. The lack of data on human capital might explain why this relationship is
not more analyzed in the existing literature. We are wary of the weakness of the measure
when interpreting the results.
3.4 Ownership Structure
A high concentration of ownership induces high levels of monitoring and control (Burkart
et al., 1997). Demsetz and Lehn (1985) emphasize that the more concentrated the
ownership is, the greater the degree to which the same owner bears the benefits and costs
of monitoring. Hence, a large owner is more likely to exercise closer monitoring over
management than smaller owners. Gogineni et al. (2013) provide support for this argument
based on the free-rider hypothesis stating that the incentive for each shareholder to incur
all of the monitoring costs decreases as the number and type of shareholders increase.
The reason being the limited benefits of monitoring proportional to their ownership stake.
Consequently, increased ownership concentration reduces the need for eﬀective monitoring
by the board, which should be entailed by a reduction in director compensation. We
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 8: Ownership concentration and the level of director compensation are
negatively related
There is limited research on the relationship between ownership concentration and the
level of director compensation. In the German setting, Elston and Goldberg (2003) and
Andreas et al. (2010) detected a negative and significant relationship, supporting the
arguments of Demsetz and Lehn.
However, the relationship between ownership concentration and board monitoring is not
necessarily straightforward as directors may, for instance, primarily act on behalf of the
major shareholders at the expense of the smaller ones. Gogineni et al. (2013) explains how
firms face two forms of agency problems related to ownership structure; vertical agency
problems that exist between owners and managers, and horizontal agency problems that
exist between controlling (majority) shareholders and minority owners. However, as our
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research primarily focuses on agency problems between shareholders and management, we
find it less relevant to study horizontal agency problems in this thesis.
3.5 Gender Diversity
There is a global movement of increasing female representation on boards, led by campaigns
such as 2020 Women On Boards dedicated to increasing the female percentage on US
boards to 20% or higher by 2020. The arguments range from equality via the glass-ceiling
hypothesis to diversity. The Norwegian government introduced a gender quota on boards
to increase "competitiveness" and "equality and democracy" (Odelstingproposisjon nr.
97, 2003). §6-11 a. of the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Company Act, require all
public limited companies to have both genders represented on their boards with at least
40% from January 2008 and onward (Allmennaksjeloven, 1997).
Adams and Ferreira (2009) found gender-diverse boards to be tougher monitors, and
that this was beneficial in firms with otherwise weak governance, but it could have the
adverse eﬀect of over-monitoring in well-governed firms. The Norwegian setting provides a
natural experiment of these findings with the introduction of the gender quota presented
above. As the reference point eﬀectively changes from no requirement of females on the
board to 40%, it is an excellent opportunity to discover the diminishing positive eﬀect
of increased diversity. The finding of Adams and Ferreira (2009) is bolstered by Post
and Byron (2015), who provide evidence of a positive relationship between female board
representation and monitoring and strategy involvement. In line with agency theory,
increased monitoring should increase compensation. Adams and Ferreira (2009) support
this view by documenting strong evidence that the proportion of female directors is
associated with more equity-based pay for directors and some weak evidence of the same
link to total compensation.
On the other hand, Ahern and Dittmar (2011) found that following the gender quota
in Norway, the new female directors had significantly less CEO experience and were, on
average, eight years younger than their male co-directors. Hence, resource dependence
theory states that the decrease in human capital should reduce compensation. However,
Eckbo et al. (2019) challenge this view by documenting no eﬀect on firm value of the forced
gender-balancing, and argue that the supply of qualified female directors was suﬃciently
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large to avoid a decline in firm value.
The notion of a glass ceiling implies that gender disadvantages are stronger at the top of
the hierarchy than at lower levels and that these disadvantages become worse later in a
person’s career (Cotter et al., 2001). Baxter and Wright (2000) argue that obstacles to
promotion increase for both genders as they move up the hierarchy, but the barriers to
promotion intensify more for women than for men. Thus, in the contest of being promoted
to CEO, a female candidate must be far stronger than her male competitor to achieve
the promotion. A better CEO should imply less need for monitoring by the board, hence
should a company with a female CEO be expected to compensate the board of directors
less than in the case of a male CEO.
Hypothesis 9: Gender diversity and the level of director compensation are negatively
related
Cook et al. (2019) found a marginal significant and positive relationship between the
number of female directors and total compensation, while Adams and Ferreira (2009)
document the fraction of female directors to be positively related to total compensation,
although only at a 10% significance level.
We summarize our hypotheses in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis Variable Predicted Relationship
1 Firm Complexity Positive
2 Leverage Negative
3 Corporate Performance Positive
4 Board Size Negative
5 CEO Duality Negative
6 Social Capital Positive
7 Human Capital Positive
8 Ownership Concentration Negative
9 Gender Diversity Negative
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4 Data
In the following chapter, we elaborate on the data providing the foundation for our analysis.
Firstly, we describe the data sources drawn upon to construct our data set. Secondly,
we introduce our sample selection process and explain the trimming of our data, both
the removal and treatment of extreme observations. In the third part, we describe the
variables included in our analysis.
4.1 Data Sources
In this section, we describe the data sources on which our final data set is constructed.
This thesis draws upon two diﬀerent databases, both of which we have gained access to
through Associate Professor Aksel Mjøs and the Center for Applied Research (hereinafter
referred to as SNF ) at NHH - Norwegian School of Economics. The first database is
Firm-Level Data, containing financial information on all registered Norwegian companies
and groups from 1992 to 2016. The second database is Board of Directors Data, containing
information on all persons engaged in a formal role in a Norwegian company per year
from 1998 to 2016.
4.1.1 Firm-Level Data
We are provided with financial data on all Norwegian companies and groups from 1992 to
2016 by SNF (SNF, 2016). The original data is provided to SNF by the Brønnøysund
Register Center10 via Bisnode D&B Norway AS and in collaboration with Menon Business
Economics AS. The data has been collected and structured by SNF and Associate Professor
Aksel Mjøs. The database consists of annual and consolidated financial statement files
in addition to files containing company information and characteristics. The financial
statement files are standard, statutory financial statements combined with generated
variables based on the statements. The files containing company information include
information such as location, company category, ownership structure, board composition,
10The Brønnøysund Register Center is a government body under the Norwegian Ministry of Trade,
Industry, and Fisheries. It develops and runs digital services to coordinate and simplify the communication
between the government and individuals and firms, and it consists of several diﬀerent national computerized
registers
22 4.2 Sample Selection
and industry-standard classification (NACE).
4.1.2 Board of Directors Data
The Brønnøysund Register Center provides the data on all individuals engaged in a formal
role in Norwegian companies per year from 1998 to 2016. Formal roles include, but are
not limited to, CEO, Chairperson of the board, member of the board, and deputy member
of the board. The file contains information on the company employing the individual and
information on the individual himself. As this data is on an individual level, whereas
the former is on a firm level, we aggregate the data to firm-level in order to be able
to construct certain variables. We describe this process in the section on Independent
Variables.
Unfortunately, the data does not provide information on the board members’ ownership
of shares in the company in which they are board members. This information would have
been particularly interesting to explore more deeply as it is reasonable to believe that
board members with large stakes in the company will have more substantial incentives to
increase the monitoring activities of the companies. Moreover, the agency costs are lower
when the largest owners of the company also are members of the board.
4.2 Sample Selection
In order for the data set to be appropriate to our analysis, we have to make certain
modifications to the data. This section describes our selection criteria and treatment of
extreme observations in further detail.
Firstly, we exclude all firm-year observations with firms categorized as inactive. Thus,
the selected sample only includes firm-year observations for firms that have been active
throughout the given year. We also limit our sample only to include limited liability
companies. We consider the probability of agency conflicts to be higher for these companies
than for the other categories. If we, for instance, look at a sole proprietorship, they do
not have a board of directors. Besides, the same individual often holds the roles of owner
and CEO. Both of which decrease the likelihood of any agency conflicts occurring. Also,
we exclude all subsidiaries from the sample as they are consolidated into a Norwegian or
foreign group.
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In line with Hetland and Mjøs (2018), we exclude firms within the following industries:
agriculture, forestry, electricity generation, water management, financial services, insurance,
the government sector, education, health care, waste management, political and religious
groups, cultural services and international and non-governmental organizations. Moreover,
we exclude firms with missing industry classification. These exclusions omit pure financial
holding companies, regulated firms, sectors with significant government involvement such
as farming and health care, and public services organized as limited companies (Hetland
and Mjøs, 2018). We believe that the companies in the remaining industries are best
suited for an analysis of how director compensation is related to our dimensions of analysis
illustrated in 3.1. These refinements leave us with a sample of active commercial companies
in Norway.
Furthermore, we only include companies that pay board compensation as the purpose of
our analysis is to analyze the potential determinants of director compensation in Norwegian
companies. To ensure a certain degree of seriousness concerning the responsibilities of
the board of directors, we exclude all firm-year observations in which the average director
compensation is below NOK 30,000. This number is admittedly somewhat arbitrary,
but it is approximately equal to a moderate monthly salary in Norway.11 We believe
that this will exclude firm-year observations in which the remuneration mainly consists
of reimbursements such as for travel expenses, i.e., are wrongfully recorded. However,
it causes a plummet in the number of firm-year observations. We do not deem this
unreasonable as the drop is almost as large if we applied the alternative requirement of
minimum NOK 1 director compensation. Diﬀerent ways of remunerating the board might
cause this - e.g., for small companies, the board might exclusively consist of employees
of the firm, and thus do they receive compensation for their board commitment on their
regular payroll. Thus, our sample consists of 15,266 firm-year observations before we treat
extreme observations.
4.2.1 Treatment of Extreme Observations
Mjøs (2008, p. 43) states "Observations which with reasonable certainty can be deemed
extreme or directly inconsistent will not add value to the analysis." These observations
11The figure is based on the lower quartile of monthly salaries between 2008 and 2015, as documented
by https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/list/lonnansatt
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are often described as outliers, which Wooldridge (2012, p. 854) defines as "Observations
in a data set that are substantially diﬀerent from the bulk of the data, perhaps because of
errors or because some data are generated by a diﬀerent model than most of the other
data." There are several diﬀerent ways of treating this type of observation. Eckbo (2008)
lists three alternative ways: (i) rule of thumb12, (ii) winsorization13 and (iii) robust
regressions14. Through an exploratory data analysis, we have identified and treated
extreme and unrealistic firm-year observations within the data set by using the rule of
thumb and winsorization approaches.
Using rules of thumb, we have excluded firm-year observations with financial figures
deemed as unrealistic or too extreme. These observations will not add any value to the
analysis. More specifically, we require total assets and debt to be greater than or equal to
0. Furthermore, we require revenue to be higher than 0 and ROA to be in the range of
[-1,1].
Moreover, we have used a heuristic method of identifying and treating outliers. Linear
regression models try to fit the best line through the data points, and this fit is highly
sensitive to outliers. In order to optimize the performance of our regression models, we
have chosen to treat these outliers by winsorization in line with Mjøs (2008) as we analyze
the same data set. Since the presence of an outlier in one of the variables may indicate
that several data-elements in that firm-year observation may be misguiding (Mjøs, 2008),
we choose to drop the outliers instead of replacing them by the cut-oﬀ percentile. We
performed winsorization on the distributions of board compensation, leverage, and revenue.
For leverage, we drop firm-year observations exceeding the 1st and 99th percentiles. For
board compensation and revenue, we only drop firm-year observations exceeding the
99th percentile, as we have already removed the extreme values on the low end of the
distribution for these variables using a rule of thumb. The method is purely statistical
and does not involve any subjective reasoning (Mjøs, 2008).
Table 4.1 below summarizes the sample selection process. We observe a dramatic decrease
12The rule of thumb method involves removing data deemed so extreme that it cannot be correct
13Winsorization is a purely statistical approach where the most extreme tails of the distribution,
typically 1% of each tail, are replaced by the value just above/below this threshold (Eckbo, 2008). Thus,
one does not remove the observations, but the range of observations of that particular variable narrows.
14In robust regressions, the robust regression estimator is relatively insensitive to extreme observations
(Wooldridge, 2012)
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in the number of observations when applying the exclusion criteria of minimum NOK
30,000 board compensation. However, this is reasonable, as many firms in the initial
sample do not pay any board compensation at all. More specifically, the decrease would
be almost as dramatic if we applied the alternative requirement of a minimum of 1 NOK
in board compensation.
Table 4.1: Sample-Selection Process
Removed
Observations
Remaining
Observations
Observations in the SNF database from 2004 to 2016 3,162,001
1) Remove inactive firms 137,062 3,024,939
2) Remove firms not registered as a limited liability
company 335,733 2,689,206
3) Remove subsidiary firms 837,548 1,851,658
4) Remove pure financial holding companies, regulated
firms and firms with significant government involvement 432,323 1,419,335
5) Remove firms paying director compensation below
NOK 30,000 1,404,069 15,266
6) Removal of extreme observations 728 14,538
Final Sample 14,538
Table 4.1 presents the sample-selection process as described in Section 4.2.
4.3 Variable Description
This section elaborates on the variables included in our analysis. Our dependent variable
and the financial variables categorized as Firm Characteristics and Corporate Performance
have all been inflation-adjusted to 2016 NOK15 in order to show real changes, and avoid
a bias arising from inflation. This adjustment is required as our data set encompasses
observations that diﬀer to a high degree in terms of time, and the absolute value variables
would not be comparable otherwise. It also allows us to eliminate the influence of inflation
when we compute time eﬀects in some of our models, as this eﬀect is rather uninteresting.
4.3.1 Dependent Variable
In line with the purpose of this thesis, our dependent variable is total compensation per
director. As our data is on a firm level, we divide the total compensation to the board
15We adjust the financial figures using the Norwegian Consumer Price Index from
https://www.ssb.no/kpi
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by the number of directors on the board. The total compensation to the board is given
in the companies’ financial statements and include all payments to the board. This sum
is mainly a fixed fee approved by the general assembly and, in some cases, a fixed fee
plus a fee per meeting. By computing the average compensation to a board member
of the company, we ignore the fact that the chairperson of the board usually receives
considerably higher compensation than do the other board members. The distinction
between these two levels of remuneration would be an interesting study in itself. However,
private limited companies are not required to provide a more detailed specification of its
board compensation in the financial statements, but listed companies provide a detailed
allocation in their annual reports. Moreover, to reduce skewness in this particular variable,
we have chosen to perform a logarithmic transformation (Appendix A1.1).
The NUES recommends that the remuneration to the directors should not be linked to
the company’s performance, as this might weaken the independence of the board. Hence,
we believe that the compensation listed in the statements primarily reflects monetary
remuneration without a performance-contingent bonus element.
We supplement our group data with single company filings on board compensation in the
case of no reported compensation in the group filing. The reason being that we have to
remove the observations of single company filings if they also file consolidated statements
in order to avoid two observations of the same company in a given year. Thus, we keep
several more group filings that we would otherwise exclude by requiring a minimum NOK
30,000 director compensation.
4.3.2 Independent Variables
We categorize our independent variables according to the dimensions presented in the
introduction and Figure 3.1: Firm Characteristics, Corporate Performance, Board
Characteristics, Ownership Structure and Gender Diversity.
4.3.2.1 Firm Characteristics
As outlined under the hypotheses development, we proxy firm complexity by Firm Size
and Risk following existing literature (e.g. Bryan et al., 2000; Brick et al., 2006; Linn and
Park, 2005). A firm’s size can be measured by its assets, sales, or number of employees,
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but we choose to measure size as the natural logarithm of total revenue.
In the absence of market-risk measures for all observations, we proxy our risk using the
accounting-based Altman’s Z-score Model. Altman’s Z-score was introduced by NYU
Stern Finance Professor Edward Altman in 1968 and was initially used to predict the
probability of bankruptcy for publicly-traded manufacturing companies. However, in
2002 he introduced a revised model applicable for private, non-manufacturing companies
(Altman, 2002). The Z-score is used to categorize firms as either safe (Z > 2.6), distressed
(Z < 1.1) or somewhere in between (the gray zone) (1.1 < Z < 2.6). We use these zones of
discrimination to create dummy variables for each zone. The Z-score model is presented
in Equation 4.1.
Z-Score Bankruptcy Model for Private Non-Manufacturers:
Z = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 (4.1)
X1 = (current assets - current liabilities) / total assets
X2 = retained earnings / total assets
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes / total assets
X4 = book value of equity / total liabilities
Repeated tests up to 1999 showed that the initial Z-score model was able to predict
bankruptcy one year before the event with approximately 80-90% accuracy. Altman
(2002) presumes the revised model to be somewhat less reliable than the original, but only
slightly.
An alternative measure of accounting-based risk is the SEBRA model utilized by Norges
Bank, as introduced by Eklund et al. (2001). This model "estimates bankruptcy
probabilities using key figures calculated on the basis of enterprises’ annual accounts,
and information on their age, size, and industry classification" (p. 102 Bernhardsen and
Larsen, 2007). By running a logit regression, the model estimates the probability that the
enterprise will open bankruptcy within three years. However, the model is more complex;
thus we prefer the simpler Z-Score, and include the SEBRA model in our robustness
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analysis.
Our second hypothesizes relates leverage ratio to our dependent variable, as debt may
function as a substitute monitoring device due to its potentially disciplining eﬀect. We
measure the leverage ratio as total debt to total assets. Thirdly, we include the age of the
firm as a control variable and log-transform it.
In order to take into consideration the sector in which the company operates, we create
sector dummies based on the sector specification in the firm-level data. We create
sector dummies for Primary Industries, Wholesale/Retail, Construction, Transportation,
Manufacturing, Oﬀshore/Shipping, Telecom/IT/Tech and Other services.
4.3.2.2 Corporate Performance
We use Return on Assets (ROA) as an accounting-based measure of corporate performance
in line with existing literature (e.g. Brick et al., 2006; Ghosh, 2006; Andreas et al., 2010).
We compute ROA as net income before extraordinary items divided by the total assets
of the company. Alternatively, we could measure corporate performance by employing
EBITDA margin, Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) or Return on Equity (ROE), but
ROA is the preferred measure in the existing literature. We will, however, make use of
the ROE measure in our robustness analysis.
4.3.2.3 Board Characteristics
Board Size is defined as the number of board members extracted from the board of
directors data, and is given in the SNF data. In order to rectify the skewness of the
distribution, we log-transform the board size variable (Appendix A1.1). CEO Duality
is a dummy variable indicating 1 if the chairperson and the CEO is the same person,
in line with the definition of Rechner and Dalton (1991), and 0 otherwise. We extract
the name and birth date of CEOs and Chairpersons from the Board of Directors data
and concatenate the two to create a unique ID key, which we use to control if the ID is
equivalent in both the role of CEO and the role of chairperson. This unique ID key is
required to avoid problems in the instance of individuals with similar names. It is not
problematic for the CEO Duality dummy, but is of great importance when we add up the
directorships held by a single person for our Directorships dummy. This dummy variable
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equals 1 in the case where more than 50% of the board hold five or more additional
directorships in the year of observation, and 0 otherwise, based on Andreas et al. (2010)
and Fich and Shivdasani (2006). Note that the number of directorships held is based
on the board of directors data before the sample-selection process, i.e., the population.
Lastly, we proxy the human capital of the board as the average age of the members of the
board in the Average Age variable, following (Cook et al., 2019).
4.3.2.4 Ownership Structure
We proxy the Ownership Structure of the company in two diﬀerent ways in our study.
First, we measure the concentration of ownership by using the Herfindahl/Hirschman
index16 measured as HHI =
Pn
◆=1 s
2
◆ As we can tell from the equation, an HHI of 1 occurs
in the case of sole ownership of the company. The lower the value, the more dispersed
ownership.
Secondly, we include a dummy variable to indicate if the company is listed or not. We
assume that listed companies have, on average, more dispersed ownership as a natural
consequence of the ownership stakes trading in the open market.
4.3.2.5 Gender Diversity
Our Gender Diversity variables Fraction of Female Directors, measuring the share of
females on the board, and Female CEO equalling 1 if the CEO is female, as per e.g.,
Adams and Ferreira (2009). The fraction is computed based on the Firm-Level data, which
includes the count of female board members and the total number of board members.
Additionally, the data reports the gender of the CEO.
16This measure is provided in the data set by SNF. In the formula, s is the individual shareholder ◆’s
share of the company for all shareholders n.
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5 Methodology
This section outlines our methodological approach to explore which factors aﬀect the
level of director compensation. We provide the underlying econometric theory, as well as
discussing the relevance of the diﬀerent models designed to explore determinants. Lastly,
we present the regression equations for our empirical analysis, which is the topic of the
next chapter.
5.1 Econometric Theory
Multiple regression is the most widely used statistical technique in social sciences and
involves studying the relationship between a single dependent variable and one or more
independent variables (Allison, 1999). The previous chapter elaborates on both the
dependent and independent variables. Given our considerable number of independent
variables and the purpose of this thesis, multiple regression is the preferred statistical
method to analyze and discover the determinants of director compensation.
Multiple linear regression (MLR) requires fulfillment of the five Gauss-Markov assumptions
in order for the OLS estimators to be the Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUES)
(Wooldridge, 2012). First, the model must be linear in its parameters, meaning that the
dependent variable is a linear function of the independent variables and an error term.
Secondly, sampling is required to be random. The third assumption is concerned with
the case of multicollinearity. There can be no multicollinearity in the data, meaning that
none of the independent variables are constant, and there are no exact linear relationships
among the independent variables. Penultimately, the error term must have an expected
value of zero given any values of the independent variables, i.e., zero conditional means.
This assumption sometimes is referred to as the Exogeneity assumption (Wooldridge,
2012). Under these four assumptions, the OLS estimators are unbiased estimators of the
population parameters. The last assumption is that the error term has the same variance
given any values of the independent variables, i.e., homoskedasticity. This final assumption
ensures that through MLR 1 to 5, the estimators have the lowest variance, namely best in
the BLUE acronym.
Multiple regression analysis provides the foundation of our empirical approach in
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attempting to answer our research question "What determines the level of director
compensation in Norwegian companies?" In order to explore the determinants of director
compensation, we estimate variants of the following empirical model:
ln(CompensationPerDirector◆⌧ ) = f(Firm Charecteristics◆⌧ ,Corporate Performance◆⌧ ,
Board Characteristics◆⌧ ,Ownership structure◆⌧ ,Gender Diversity◆⌧ )
(5.1)
This model relates our dependent variable, Compensation per Director, to five diﬀerent
categories of determinants, as presented in Figure 3.1.
We described the data providing the foundation for our analysis in detail in the previous
chapter. The data covers Norwegian companies reporting financial statements over
the period 2004-2016 and thus has both a cross-sectional and a time-series dimension.
Naturally, both listings and bankruptcies are occurring in this period, causing some
companies to go out of our sample while others enter it. Hence, it is a unbalanced panel
data set, and we will not try to balance it, i.e., only include firms with observations in
every year from 2004 to 2016, as it would make the sample heavily biased (Wooldridge,
2012). Wooldridge (2012, p. 491) states that "Provided the reason we have missing data
for some i is not correlated with the idiosyncratic errors,  ◆⌧ , the unbalanced panel causes
no problems."
Furthermore, the unbalanced nature does not aﬀect the regression analysis as our statistical
packages can handle this particular issue. However, panel data is commonly exposed to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. We detect the former by performing a Breusch-
Pagan test, and the latter by performing a Breusch-Godfrey test. The presence of serial
correlation is considerably intuitive; board compensation in year ⌧   1 is likely to be a
good predictor of (i.e., correlated with) the board compensation in year ⌧ , hence will the
error terms be correlated. Taken together, we cluster our standard errors to make them
robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
In the classical linear regression, we have a dependent variable, y, sought to be explained
by a constant (intercept),  0, some independent variables,  k, as well as an error term, ",
which captures the unobserved factors aﬀecting the dependent variable. Wooldridge (2012)
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proposes to view the unobserved factors as consisting of two types where the first type is
constant over time while the second varies over time, ↵◆ and  ◆⌧ .17 This is illustrated in
Equation 5.2. Wooldridge (2012) introduces four alternative ways of handling this type of
equations: Pooled OLS, First-Diﬀerence, Fixed Eﬀects, and Random Eﬀects.
y◆⌧ =  0 +  1 ◆⌧1 + ...+  k ◆⌧k + ↵◆ +  ◆⌧ (5.2)
5.1.1 Pooled OLS
Pooled OLS is essentially a regular OLS performed on a pooled cross-section, and requires
fulfillment of all of the abovementioned MLR assumptions. It is computationally easy
and allows for the intercept to be diﬀerent across periods by including year dummies
(Wooldridge, 2012). However, this method has its drawbacks. From the fourth MLR
assumption previously introduced, we have to assume that ↵◆ as well as  ◆⌧ is uncorrelated
with the explanatory variables. Violation of this assumption will result in a heterogeneity
bias, caused by omitting a time-constant variable (Wooldridge, 2012). As the main
reason for collecting panel data is to allow correlation between the ↵◆ and the explanatory
variables while pooled OLS assumes no such correlation, we will consider other models.
5.1.2 First Diﬀerence
The first-diﬀerence approach (FD) takes advantage of ↵◆ being constant over time and
diﬀerences two consecutive periods to remove the term from the equation. This approach
does, however, rely on two crucial assumptions. The first is the strict exogeneity
assumption, which requires   ◆ to be uncorrelated with   ◆, and is upheld as long
as  ◆⌧ at each time t is uncorrelated with the explanatory variable in both periods
(Wooldridge, 2012). This rules out cases in which one uses a lagged dependent variable
to explain the dependent variable. Secondly,   ◆ must have some variation across ◆,
i.e., the variables are required to change over time. The reason being that we allow
correlation between ↵◆ and  ◆⌧ , and it is infeasible to separate the eﬀect of ↵◆ on y◆ from
the eﬀect of any variable that does not change over time (Wooldridge, 2012). Moreover,
first diﬀerencing requires satisfaction of the homoskedasticity assumption. We correct for
17Note the diﬀerence in subscripts: the ↵ has no time subscript whereas the   has, highlighting the
time-varying aspect of the factor.
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the presence of homoskedasticity by computing robust standard errors.
In a comparison of First diﬀerence with the Pooled OLS estimation, Wooldridge (2012,
pp. 473:474) states "...it can be worse than pooled OLS if one or more of the explanatory
variables are subject to measurement error". Hence, the FD approach is also prone to
fallacies, leading us to the fixed eﬀects approach.
5.1.3 Fixed Eﬀects and Random Eﬀects
In the fixed-eﬀects approach (FE), the equation 5.2 is transformed by time-demeaning to
remove the ↵◆ term and thus allows for the observations to not be in chronological order.
Consequently, we keep more of our observations by employing this model. Moreover,
the FE allows for interpretation of the ↵◆ as an intercept for entity ◆ by including a
dummy variable for each ◆ (Wooldridge, 2012). The ◆ may take on several forms, e.g.,
company, industry, or individual, but we choose company for our analysis as we believe
compensation to be largely company-dependent. We challenge this by including industry
dummies in the robustness testing. Furthermore, FE is unbiased and consistent under the
same assumptions as FD, so the choice between the two hinges on the eﬃciency of the
estimates determined by the serial correlation of  ◆⌧ versus   ◆⌧ , which is challenging to
test Wooldridge (2012). As our research is similar to the existing literature on this topic,
we have no reason to believe that we should employ another model than this literature
is based on, and therefore assume that FE is the most well-fitted model. Furthermore,
due to diﬀering interpretations of the coeﬃcients under the two models, the employment
of the FE model allows us to compare our results with the findings from the reviewed
literature.
In addition to FE, the existing literature partly employs the Random Eﬀects model (RE)
(e.g., Andreas et al., 2010). The critical assumption in this model is that ↵◆ is uncorrelated
with each explanatory variable in all periods; see Equation 5.3.
Cov( ◆⌧j,↵◆) = 0, ⌧ = 1, 2, ..., T ; j = 1, 2, ..., k. (5.3)
The RE model is applied in situations where the key explanatory variable is constant over
time, thus ruling out FE (Wooldridge, 2012). However, the specification test proposed in
Hausman (1978) often dismisses the RE. In the case of rejection of the null hypothesis in
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the Hausman test, the RE assumption is deemed false, and the FE estimates are preferred
(Wooldridge, 2012). We perform this test and reject the null hypothesis of the satisfaction
of equation 5.3. Thus, we will employ FE as our primary model of regression.
5.2 Regression Models
In the following section, we make a stepwise explanation toward our final regression model
incorporating all five dimensions from our research model in Fig 3.1. The variables are
explained in Appendix A2.1. To avoid confusion, we emphasize the nature of each variable,
i.e., whether it is log-transformed, linear, or binary, for each equation. In the initial model,
we regress the logarithm of compensation per director on Firm Characteristics, and then
we include the other dimensions sequentially. We run the equations employing a two-way
fixed eﬀects model, in which we perform both time- and entity-demeaning operation.
Due to the various natures of our independent variables, i.e., some are log-transformed,
others are binary, and yet another group is linear, we will shortly introduce the
interpretation of the coeﬃcients in relation to a log-transformed dependent variable.
For linear variables, a 1 unit increase in  ◆ is associated with a 100* ◆% increase in
the level of director compensation. Meanwhile, for log-transformed variables, we have a
log-log case in which a 1% increase in  ◆ is associated with a  ◆% increase in the level of
director compensation. Lastly, in the case of binary variables, the eﬀect of switching the
dummy from 0 to 1 is associated with a (e    1)*100% increase in the level of director
compensation.
In Equation 5.4 we formulate our initial two-way fixed eﬀects model in which we regress
our dependent variable to variables proxying for Firm Characteristics for a firm ◆ in a year
⌧ . Size and Firm Age are both log transformed, while Leverage is not. We measure the
firm’s riskyness by Altman’s revised Z-Score, indicating whether the firm-year observation
is in the Safe Zone, Gray Zone or the Distress Zone.
ln(CompensationPerDirector◆⌧ ) =  0 +  1Size◆⌧ +  2D
GrayZone
◆⌧ +  3D
DistressZone
◆⌧ +
 4Leverage◆⌧ +  5FirmAge◆⌧ + ↵◆ +  ◆⌧
(5.4)
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Next, we add the Corporate Performance dimension to our fixed eﬀects model by including
ROA. We measure this dimension as the Return on Assets in the preceding period, and is
thus a linear variable.
ln(CompensationPerDirector◆⌧ ) =  0 +  1Size◆⌧ +  2D
Gray Zone
◆⌧ +  3D
DistressZone
◆⌧ +
 4Leverage◆⌧ +  5FirmAge◆⌧ +  6ROA◆⌧ 1 + ↵◆ +  ◆⌧
(5.5)
In the third model, we add Board Characteristics to our equation to explore its eﬀect on
the level of director compensation. The Board Size variable have been log transformed,
the Human Capital is linear while CEO Duality and Directorships are dummy variables.
ln(CompensationPerDirector◆⌧ ) =  0 +  1Size◆⌧ +  2D
Gray Zone
◆⌧ +  3D
DistressZone
◆⌧ +
 4Leverage◆⌧ +  5FirmAge◆⌧ +  6ROA◆⌧ 1 +  7Board Size◆⌧+
 8D
CEODuality
◆⌧ +  9D
Directorships
◆⌧ +  10HumanCapital◆⌧ + ↵◆ +  ◆⌧
(5.6)
Believing that the Ownership Structure might aﬀect the level of board compensation, we
include variables proxying this dimension in 5.7. Note that Ownership Concentration is a
linear variable ranging from 0 to 1, while Listed is a binary variable.
ln(CompensationPerDirector◆⌧ ) =  0 +  1Size◆⌧ +  2D
Gray Zone
◆⌧ +  3D
DistressZone
◆⌧ +
 4Leverage◆⌧ +  5FirmAge◆⌧ +  6ROA◆⌧ 1 +  7Board Size◆⌧+
 8D
CEODuality
◆⌧ +  9D
Directorships
◆⌧ +  10HumanCapital◆⌧+
 11OwnershipConcentration◆⌧ +  12D
Listed
◆⌧ + ↵◆ +  ◆⌧
(5.7)
Lastly, we include the dimension of Gender Diversity to complete our final regression
model. Female Fraction is a linear variable ranging from 0 to 1, while Female CEO is a
binary variable.
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ln(CompensationPerDirector◆⌧ ) =  0 +  1Size◆⌧ +  2D
Gray Zone
◆⌧ +  3D
DistressZone
◆⌧ +
 4Leverage◆⌧ +  5FirmAge◆⌧ +  6ROA◆⌧ 1 +  7Board Size◆⌧+
 8D
CEODuality
◆⌧ +  9D
Directorships
◆⌧ +  10HumanCapital◆⌧+
 11OwnershipConcentration◆⌧ +  12D
Listed
◆⌧ +
 13Female Fraction◆⌧ +  14D
FemaleCEO
◆⌧ + ↵◆ +  ◆⌧
(5.8)
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6 Empirical Results
In this section, we will present the results of our analyses. Firstly, we explore the nature of
our sample by computing descriptive statistics and contrast this to companies not paying
board compensation. Secondly, we analyze what variables determine the level of board
compensation. We challenge our analysis by running robustness tests in the last part.
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
The following section will present descriptive statistics for our sample. We compute
the statistics on the processed data sample following the presented exclusion criteria
and treatment of extreme observations (Section 4.2). The section starts by presenting
our sample in general terms before looking explicitly at the included dependent and
independent variables. Ultimately, we contrast the independent variables of the sample
to the independent variables of the companies excluded on the requirement of minimum
NOK 30,000 director compensation.
6.1.1 Sample Characteristics
The initial data set included all registered Norwegian companies and groups for the period
2004 to 2016. Following our exclusion criteria and treatment of extreme observations, we
have sought to sample all active commercial companies in Norway that we consider to
have a board of directors with serious monitoring responsibilities. Furthermore, we have
chosen only to analyze companies within the industries we consider best suited for having
a relationship between director compensation and our dimensions of analysis.
6.1.2 Dependent Variable
As the sample consists of companies within diﬀerent industries and regions over time, we
can perform comprehensive analyses of the characteristics, variations, and development of
director compensation in Norway.
Table 6.1 presents the summary statistics for average board compensation per board
member between 2004 and 2016. We observe that the number of observations within
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any given year ranges between 724 and 1,407, providing us with an impressive number of
observations per year. Further, Table 6.1 shows that the median director compensation
grows from NOK 54,360 in 2004 to NOK 83,380 in 2016, which is equivalent to a CAGR
of 3.6%. The mean director compensation grows at a slightly higher CAGR of 5.4% from
NOK 82,180 to NOK 154,250. Furthermore, we observe a gradual increase in the spread
from the mean over the period. The standard deviation more than doubled from NOK
77,600 in 2004 to NOK 157,990 in 2016.
Table 6.1: Director Compensation per Year (2016 kNOK)
N Mean St.Dev Min p25 Median p75 Max
2004 899 82.18 77.60 30.06 38.37 54.36 95.93 703.46
2005 867 85.27 82.27 30.03 38.83 55.39 96.51 684.79
2006 724 88.32 93.84 30.02 38.96 55.37 96.73 723.23
2007 1,062 87.97 92.60 30.14 36.65 56.10 97.74 804.40
2008 989 88.38 85.38 30.02 39.56 58.86 96.54 706.36
2009 1,060 85.58 86.23 30.19 39.18 57.62 94.21 766.34
2010 1,137 102.74 109.10 30.05 42.18 60.74 112.49 843.65
2011 1,173 92.95 100.68 30.14 39.70 55.52 106.60 841.12
2012 1,330 139.20 152.92 30.01 44.13 69.88 166.32 875.29
2013 1,234 131.10 144.30 30.25 43.21 67.52 162.04 899.01
2014 1,277 142.13 155.40 30.05 42.33 74.47 177.57 900.55
2015 1,379 148.84 157.88 30.04 45.48 79.77 196.88 904.95
2016 1,407 154.25 157.99 30.20 48.75 83.38 209.33 897.00
Total 14,538 114.17 127.25 30.01 41.42 61.91 125.88 904.95
Table 6.1 presents summary statistics for director compensation per year between 2004 and 2016. All
figures are adjusted for inflation to 2016 kNOK. Average board compensation is calculated by dividing
total board compensation for the company by the number of board members.
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Figure 6.1: Director Compensation per year (2016 kNOK)
Figure 6.1 presents the development of director compensation between 2004 and 2016. All figures are
adjusted for inflation to 2016 kNOK. The solid black line shows the median, and the dotted black line
shows the mean. The shaded area illustrates the interquartile range.
Furthermore, Figure 6.1 presents the development of director compensation graphically.
We observe that the median is lower than the mean in any given year, indicating significant
outliers in the high end of the distribution. This observation is consistent with the positive
skewness observed in Appendix A1.1. Moreover, the shaded area in Figure 6.1 illustrates
the interquartile range.18 We observe superior growth in the upper quartile compared to
the lower, causing the observed divergence of the shaded area.
The observed trend in Figure 6.1 is similar to the one found in the Norwegian Board
Compensation Survey presented in Figure 1.1 in the introduction. For the period between
2010 and 2016, the survey reports a CAGR of 5.5% and 6.3% for the median and mean,
respectively. In comparison, the median and mean CAGR within the same period for
our sample are 5.4% and 7.0%, respectively. However, the level of director compensation
in our sample is significantly lower due to the survey being conducted solely on listed
and state-owned companies. We consider this reasonable as our sample also encompasses
smaller, private companies.
Figure 6.1 follows the development of director compensation through two major crises in
18The interquartile range, also known as the midspread or H-spread, is a measure of statistical
dispersion defined as the range between the upper and lower quartile.
40 6.1 Descriptive Statistics
the economy; the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and the oil price shock of 2014. However,
the observed development does not insinuate that the level of director compensation is
susceptible to these economic shocks. Whereas the Norwegian GDP per capita fell by
8.0% between 2008 and 200919 and the Oslo Stock Exchange Index fell by 64.0% between
the peak on 05/22/2008 and the lowest point on 11/21/2008, the average level of board
compensation per board member in our sample only fell by 3.2% between 2008 and 2009.
The smaller eﬀect on director compensation might be due to it being set on an annual
basis, and thus not being as susceptible to shocks. In contrast, the average real wage in
Norway grew by 1.3% from 2008 to 2009, according to Statistics Norway. The relationship
between director compensation and corporate performance will be analyzed further in
section 6.2.
Further, it is interesting to analyze how director compensation diﬀers between sectors and
regions as our sample includes a broad range of companies with considerably diﬀerent
characteristics. Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics for director compensation per
sector and region.
As Table 6.2 indicates, we observe variations both concerning the number of observations
and the level of director compensation between the diﬀerent industry classifications. The
number of firm-year observations ranges from 338 within the primary industries to 5,324
within the construction sector. Thus, our sample includes a considerable quantity of
firm-year observations within all of the eight included sectors, albeit not equally distributed
across sectors.
The statistics show that the median levels for most sectors are reasonably close
to the sample median, whereas we see more variation concerning the mean. The
Oﬀshore/Shipping sector is prominent in this regard, with a mean of NOK 142,400,
24.7% higher than the sample mean of NOK 114,170. This observation is consistent with
the findings in the Norwegian Board Compensation Survey of 2017 for publicly listed and
state-owned companies, documenting that companies within the energy sector, on average,
pay higher board compensations (Norsk Institutt for Styremedlemmer, 2017). On the
other hand, we find that companies within the Telecom/IT/Tech sector have the lowest
19According to Statistics Norway, the GDP per capita fell from NOK 546,765 in 2008 to NOK 502,924 in
2009. For more information, visit https://www.ssb.no/nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/faktaside/norsk-
okonomi
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level of board compensation of NOK 103,310 per director, 9.5% below the sample mean.
A graphical presentation of the summary statistics per sector is included in Appendix
A1.2.
Table 6.2: Director Compensation per Sector and Region (kNOK)
N Mean St.Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max
Total Sample 14,538 114.17 127.75 30.01 41.42 61.91 125.88 904.95
Sector
Construction 5,324 107.20 122.02 30.01 39.68 57.62 112.49 897.00
Manufacturing 1,304 106.27 101.60 30.09 41.44 61.61 127.57 639.01
Oﬀshore/Shipping 654 142.40 138.88 30.03 54.01 86.45 195.80 841.12
Other Services 3,182 126.46 147.75 30.02 42.18 64.10 143.46 904.95
Primary Industries 338 126.57 142.90 30.14 42.34 67.48 139.02 875.29
Telecom/IT/Tech 927 103.31 104.91 30.08 42.70 64.39 117.61 818.54
Transport 607 111.85 139.46 30.04 39.09 55.52 114.19 860.58
Wholesale/Retail 2,202 112.89 117.28 30.02 43.21 64.37 129.60 900.55
Region
Innlandet 454 89.75 91.48 30.02 36.65 50.31 101.69 687.90
Nord-Norge 1,335 107.38 121.56 30.21 38.79 56.62 113.10 844.03
Sørlandet 717 133.10 142.10 30.21 42.68 74.91 168.45 898.80
Trøndelag 1,031 116.25 133.49 30.01 38.74 57.62 130.85 899.01
Vest-Viken 1,342 99.96 108.52 30.14 40.03 57.62 111.04 808.72
Vestlandet 3,543 107.26 124.58 30.03 40.31 58.86 110.74 900.55
Østviken 5,933 120.30 129.86 30.02 43.33 68.28 136.51 904.95
Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics for director compensation per sector and region. The sectors are
organized based on industry codes. The regions are based on the specification in SNF (2016), and consist
of Innlandet (Hedmark, Oppland), Nord-Norge (Nordland, Troms, Finnmark), Sørlandet (Aust-Agder,
Vest-Agder), Trøndelag (Sør- og Nord-Trøndelag), Vest-Viken (Buskerud, Vestfold, Telemark), Vestlandet
(Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordande, Møre og Romsdal) and Østviken (Østfold, Oslo, Akershus).
Further, we observe that most companies are registered in Østviken. We deem this
reasonable as this is the highest populated region in Norway and the region where most
companies are registered.20 Meanwhile, Innlandet is the region with the fewest firm-year
observations in our sample.
As with sectors, we also observe variations in director compensation levels between the
diﬀerent regions. Sørlandet is the superior region with a mean director compensation of
NOK 133,100, 16.6% above the sample mean. Further, we observe that Innlandet has
the lowest level of director compensation. Directors are, on average, paid NOK 89,750
per year in this region, approximately one-fifth less than the sample mean. A graphical
20In 2019, 31% of all company’s registered in Norway were located in Østviken. The statistics are
available at https://www.ssb.no/virksomheter-foretak-og-regnskap/statistikker/bedrifter
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presentation of the summary statistics per region is included in Appendix A1.3.
6.1.3 Independent Variables
This section will present descriptive statistics for the independent variables included in
our analysis. The variables are categorized according to the dimensions presented in
our research model (Figure 3.1). Table 6.3 summarizes the summary statistics for the
independent variables in our sample.
The summary statistics indicate significant variation concerning firm size. The interquartile
range for firm revenue ranges between MNOK 3.7 and MNOK 113.8, with a mean of
MNOK 237.3. The interquartile range for total assets is between MNOK 5.2 and MNOK
147.7, with a mean of MNOK 450.3. Taken together, we have included a representative
share of small-, medium-, and large-sized companies in the economy. Notably, the mean
is larger than the upper quartile for both size measures. This indicates significant outliers
in the high end of the distribution and thus a positive skew. Moreover, we observe
that Altman’s Z-score model for credit-risk analysis characterizes 57.3% of the firm-year
observations as safe, 23.1% as distressed, while the remaining 19.6% are placed somewhere
in between these zones, namely gray. In addition, we observe that the mean debt-to-assets
ratio is 62.8% and that the average firm age is approximately 20 years.
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Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
N Mean St.Dev. p25 Median p75
Firm Characteristics
Revenue (kNOK) 14,538 237,304 853,536 3,697 16,538 113,809
Assets (kNOK) 14,538 450,318 2,275,568 5,207 25,463 147,749
Risk
Safe Zone 14,538 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000
Gray Zone 14,538 0.196 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.000
Distress Zone 14,538 0.231 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leverage 14,538 0.628 0.295 0.436 0.645 0.808
Firm Age 14,538 20.192 21.669 6.000 13.000 25.000
Firm Performance
ROA 14,538 0.056 0.173 0.013 0.048 0.380
Board Characteristics
Board Size 14,538 3.482 1.863 2.000 3.000 5.000
CEO Duality 14,538 0.193 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000
Directorships 14,538 0.320 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000
Human Capital 14,538 52.575 8.405 47.600 52.667 58.000
Ownership Structure
Ownership
Concentration 14,104 0.432 0.309 0.200 0.346 0.500
Listed 14,538 0.051 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gender Diversity
Fraction of
Female Directors 14,538 0.181 0.252 0.000 0.181 0.300
Female CEO 11,979 0.120 0.325 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 6.3 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in our analysis.
To evaluate firm performance, we analyze the companies’ return on assets (ROA). We
observe that the interquartile range of observations is between 1.3% and 38.0%. The
average ROA for the sample is 5.6%, and the median is 4.8%.
Further, it is interesting to analyze how Norwegian companies structure their board of
directors. We find that the average board in Norway includes approximately 3.5 directors.
The average percentage of females representatives is 18.1%, i.e., approximately every fifth
board member is a woman. In comparison, the fraction of female board members in
Russell 3000 companies21 has grown from 16.0% in 2017 to 20.4% in 2019, according to
the Gender Diversity Index. We also observe that for 32.0% of the boards in our sample,
the majority of the board hold five or more additional directorships. The average age of a
21Russell 3000 is a capitalization-weighted stock market index that seeks to be a benchmark of the
entire U.S stock market.
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board member is approximately 53 years. Moreover, we find that CEO duality is the case
for 19.3% of the firm-year observations, i.e., the Chairperson and CEO is the same person.
Additionally, we observe that 12.0% of the CEOs are female, significantly higher than for
Fortune 500 companies where only 6.6% of CEOs are female as of June 2019 (Fortune
500, 2019).
We observe a mean ownership concentration, measured by the Herfindahl/Hirschman
Index (HHI), of 0.432. In addition, we find that 5.1% of the firm-year observations are of
listed companies.
Taken together, we analyze an interesting sample of both private and public companies
that operate within diﬀerent sectors and in diﬀerent regions. Moreover, we have included
a representative share of small-, medium- and large-sized companies in our sample.
Exploring the diﬀering characteristics of the companies not paying board compensation is
a study in itself, and could be explored by a probit regression. However, we explore the
summary statistics of the 1,404,069 observations removed on the requirement of minimum
NOK 30,000 director compensation and present the results in Appendix A2.2. We compute
these statistics to contrast the companies paying director compensation with the ones
who do not, within the requirements of (i) the company is active, (ii) the company is a
limited liability company, (iii) the company is not as subsidiary and (iv) the company is
not a pure financial holding company, regulated company or a company under significant
government involvement (Table 4.1). As there has been conducted no treatment of extreme
observations on these observations, the mean and standard deviation might be profoundly
aﬀected by outliers, especially for the continuous variables. Therefore, to compare the
two tables, our primary focus is the interquartile range.
Firstly, the size measures Revenue and Assets have a much higher interquartile range for
our sample as compared to the removed observations. The lower quartile of our sample
for both measures is close to the upper quartile of the removed observations, indicating
that mainly larger companies pay director compensation. With regard to risk, the two
are considerably similar concerning whether the firm-year observation is in the Safe Zone
or in a riskier environment, namely Gray Zone or Distress Zone, by looking at the mean
observation. Moreover, the leverage ratio in the interquartile range is rather similar in the
two tables, whereas the firms included in our sample seem to be older than the firms not
6.2 Determinants of Director Compensation 45
paying compensation.
Secondly, the ROA is significantly lower in Appendix A2.2 than in Table 6.3, suggesting
that we include, on average, financial healthier companies. That is to the degree ROA
can measure financial healthiness alone.
Thirdly, with regard to the characteristics of the board, it becomes evident that the
requirement of minimum NOK 30,000 director compensation excludes many of the
companies where the board consists of only one person and where that person is also the
CEO of the company. In this case, the compensation for undertaken board tasks is likely
to be registered on the regular payroll, and not as director compensation. This, in turn,
aﬀects the Directorships variable in the sense that we in our sample include boards with
professional directors, i.e., individuals who are directors on a full-time basis. The Human
Capital variable’s upper quartile is 99.000, according to Appendix A2.2, indicating that
there is some misreporting on age.
Penultimately, the lower mean of Ownership Concentration in our sample indicates that
we exclude the one-person companies in which there is only one owner. Naturally, the
Listed variable has a much smaller mean for the excluded companies. This is both due to
the listed companies being very few as compared to unlisted, e.g., only 182 companies were
listed on Oslo Stock Exchange in December 2016,22 and partly due to listed companies
being more likely to pay director compensation due to the increased requirements.
Lastly, the Gender Diversity variables are largely comparable between the two tables.
6.2 Determinants of Director Compensation
We seek to determine what factors influence the level of compensation per director by
regressing the natural logarithm of total compensation director on various explanatory
variables proxying firm and board characteristics, corporate performance, ownership
structure, and gender diversity. This is in line with Equation 5.1 presented in the
Methodology chapter.
22Facts and figures on the equity market of Oslo Stock Exchange is available at https://www.oslobors.
no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Statistics/Facts-and-figures
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6.2.1 Pooled OLS Regression
In this section, we will describe our pooled OLS regression, undertaken despite the model
fallacies presented in Section 5.1.1, to illustrate the relationship between some of our key
explanatory variables, sector and year dummies, and our dependent variable. In Table
6.4, we present the regression results. Note that we specify sector Construction and year
2004 as our benchmark group to avoid the dummy variable trap, which would induce
perfect collinearity in our model (Wooldridge, 2012). For the sake of readability, we only
include the dummies proving to be significant. First, we discuss the findings of the OLS
regression before we introduce the possible fallacies of pooled OLS.
In the first column of Table 6.4, we regress our dependent variable against size, leverage,
ROA, Board Size, and sector dummies, with Construction as our base group. The size
coeﬃcient is, as expected, positive, and significant, indicating that larger companies tend
to pay higher levels of director compensation. The leverage coeﬃcient is negative and
significant, providing support for the debt control hypothesis raised by Jensen (1986).
Both these coeﬃcients are supportive of our hypotheses. Meanwhile, the coeﬃcient for
ROA is negative and significant, opposite of what we expected. A possible explanation
for this might be that poorly performing firms require experienced board members who
can make the necessary changes to the company in order to increase profits later on.
Fourth, there is a significant and negative relationship between the number of board
members and the compensation per director, precisely as hypothesized. Interestingly, the
regression provides evidence of industry diﬀerences with regard to director compensation.
Companies operating in the Oﬀshore/Shipping sector and the Other Services sector pay
significantly higher director compensation than companies in the Construction sector.
This is in line with what we observed in the descriptive statistics per sector in Table
6.2, and consistent with Norsk Institutt for Styremedlemmer (2017). Conversely, the
coeﬃcient for the dummy of the Wholesale/Retail sector exhibits a weakly negative sign.
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Table 6.4: Pooled OLS Analysis
Dependent Variable Natural Logarithm of Total Compensation per Director
Model Sector dummies Year Dummies Combined
Constant 3.996***(82.687)
3.787***
(71.712)
3.764***
(71.304)
Size 0.096***(17.664)
0.095***
(18.129)
0.096***
(17.682)
Leverage -0.138***(-4.252)
-0.125***
(-3.842)
-0.111***
(-3.446)
ROA -0.287***(-6.061)
-0.273***
(-5.702)
-0.254***
(-5.358)
Board Size -0.473***(-24.793)
-0.429***
(-22.942)
-0.447***
(-23.613)
Oﬀshore/Shipping 0.258***(4.046)
0.278***
(4.349)
Other Services 0.121***(4.388)
0.116***
(4.299)
Wholesale/Retail -0.074**(-2.355)
-0.067**
(-2.176)
Y2006 0.061**(2.230)
0.053**
(1.988)
Y2008 0.045*(1.711)
0.034
(1.286)
Y2010 0.164***(5.943)
0.156***
(5.612)
Y2011 0.061**(2.308)
0.050*
(1.885)
Y2012 0.330***(11.107)
0.323***
(10.880)
Y2013 0.288***(9.582)
0.278***
(9.252)
Y2014 0.334***(11.221)
0.330***
(10.958)
Y2015 0.396***(13.267)
0.389***
(13.022)
Y2016 0.431***(14.525)
0.422***
(14.239)
R Squared 0.119 0.148 0.158
Model F-Test 177.690*** 157.201*** 118.668***
Observations 14,538 14,538 14,538
Table 6.4 describes the coeﬃcients of a pooled OLS regression of the natural logarithm of compensation
per director against some of our key explanatory variables as well as sector dummies, year dummies and
both in column (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Below the coeﬃcient estimates, we present t-statistics based
on clustered standard errors. The base group is Construction for sector and 2004 for Year. For the sake
of readability, we include only those dummies who prove significant.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
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In the second column, we include year dummies instead of sector dummies; otherwise, the
regressions are similar. In this regression, the year 2004 is our base group. Interestingly,
the first five rows are similar concerning the sign and significance of the coeﬃcients. The
time dummies for 2005, 2007, and 2009 are all insignificant and not presented for the
sake of readability. These are, however, positive, as for the later years. It is noteworthy
that the dummies for 2010 to 2016 are all positive and significant, even after we have
controlled for inflation in our data set. Notably, the coeﬃcient predominantly increases
from 2010 and onwards, implying that there is a time eﬀect in our data. This eﬀect is
coherent with the descriptive statistics per year presented in Table 6.1.
In the last column of Table 6.4, we include both sector and year dummies, and the
coeﬃcients described in the two previous paragraphs are consistent concerning the sign
and significance. The existence of sector-specific eﬀects arouses curiosity and is something
we should explore more deeply. As the sectors are somewhat roughly specified, there are
likely to be considerable intrasectoral diﬀerences. One way of handling these diﬀerences is
the fixed eﬀects transformation on individual companies, in which the unobserved eﬀects
model in Equation 5.2 is time-demeaned, thus removing the ↵i before running the pooled
OLS.
6.2.2 Fixed Eﬀects Model
In this section, we employ the fixed eﬀects model in an attempt to mitigate the problem of
unobserved heterogeneity arising on account of the existence of unobservable, firm-specific
variables. Also, there are likely unobservable, time-specific factors aﬀecting the data. The
findings in the pooled OLS analysis support this assumption. A two-way fixed eﬀects
model will take both these aspects into account in performing the regression. The reported
t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, while a more extensive
discussion of these problems follows in Section 6.3. The results are presented in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5: Determinants of Director Compensation
Dependent Variable Natural Logarithm of Total Compensation per Director
Model A B C D E
A - Firm Characteristics
Size 0.047***(6.481)
0.047***
(4.285)
0.051***
(5.308)
0.051***
(5.265)
0.048***
(4.639)
Risk
Gray Zone 0.022(1.437)
0.030
(1.597)
0.034*
(1.854)
0.035*
(1.837)
0.029
(1.340)
Distress Zone 0.019(0.915)
0.064**
(2.394)
0.068***
(2.593)
0.066**
(2.402)
0.071**
(2.319)
Leverage -0.049(-1.288)
-0.114**
(-2.097)
-0.121**
(-2.283)
-0.138**
(-2.253)
-0.155**
(-2.167)
Firm Age 0.030(1.190)
-0.055
(-1.451)
-0.052
(-1.433)
-0.053
(-1.405)
-0.084*
(-1.937)
B - Corporate Performance
ROA⌧ 1
0.025
(0.526)
0.031
(0.628)
0.026
(0.487)
0.031
(0.513)
C - Board Characteristics
Board Size -0.518**(-9.216)
-0.540***
(-9.528)
-0.533***
(-8.916)
CEO Duality (0, 1) -0.027(-0.539)
-0.037
(-0.719)
-0.036
(-0.683)
Directorships (0, 1) 0.039(1.636)
0.040*
(1.699)
0.050*
(1.867)
Human Capital 0.003(1.144)
0.003
(1.148)
0.004
(1.224)
D - Ownership Structure
Ownership
Concentration
-0.059
(-0.405)
-0.071
(-0.439)
Listed (0, 1) 0.269(1.343)
0.340
(1.469)
E - Gender Diversity
Fraction of Female
Directors
-0.092
(-0.930)
Female CEO (0, 1) 0.088(1.585)
Rsquared 0.011 0.012 0.058 0.062 0.069
Model F-Test 17.592*** 8.270*** 25.055*** 21.192*** 16.512***
Observations 14,538 6,411 6,411 6,146 5,106
Table 6.5 presents our analysis of the determinants of Director Compensation as illustrated in the research
model in Figure 3.1. In all models we control for unobserved heterogeneity by employing a two-way fixed
eﬀects regression, in which dummies for each firm and year is created. Below the coeﬃcient estimates, we
present t-statistics based on clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are provided in Section 4.3 as
well as in Appendix A2.1.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
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In column A of Table 6.5, we regress the natural logarithm of director compensation
against our Firm Characteristics variables. The first variable proxying firm complexity,
Size, has a positive and significant coeﬃcient of 0.047, implying that a 100% increase in
revenue is associated with a 4.7% increase in the level of director compensation. Risk is
the second part constituting the firm’s complexity. We leave out Safe Zone to avoid the
dummy variable trap, but both Gray Zone and Distress Zone exhibit positive coeﬃcients,
although insignificant. The coeﬃcient of Leverage is negative and insignificant, whereas
our control variable Firm Age is positive and insignificant.
In column B, we add the Corporate Performance dimension to the regression analysis.
After including last year’s ROA, the coeﬃcients of Leverage and Distress Zone turns
significant. According to this model specification, a 1 unit increase in the company’s
leverage ratio is associated with an 11% reduction in the level of director compensation.
However, if a company is in the Distress Zone according to Altman (2002), the level of
director compensation is projected to increase by approximately 6%.23 Note that the
coeﬃcient for our control variable Firm Age turns negative. Lastly, ROA⌧ 1 exhibits a
positive and insignificant coeﬃcient.
Thirdly, we include the dimension of Board Characteristics in column C. The coeﬃcients
from column B stay constant with regard to sign, but the t-statistics increases for the
coeﬃcients of Leverage, Gray Zone and Distress Zone. Following the discussion in the
previous paragraph, the risk of the company aﬀects the level of director compensation at a
lower threshold, more specifically, already when a company is in the Gray Zone. Intuitively,
the coeﬃcient is smaller than for the more severe financial situation of the Distress Zone.
Regarding the included variables of Board Characteristics, the number of directors on
the board is negatively correlated to the compensation per director, and its coeﬃcient is
significant. The case of CEO duality is also negatively related to our dependent variable,
although the coeﬃcient is not significant. Lastly, both the Directorships, proxying social
capital, and the Human Capital coeﬃcient are positive and insignificant. Note, however,
that the t-statistic of the former is close to the limit for the 10% significance level.
Penultimately, we introduce the Ownership Structure dimension with its corresponding
variables Ownership Concentration and Listed in column D. The coeﬃcient of the former
23Exact increase is given by (e    1)*100%.
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variable is negative, whereas the latter has a positive coeﬃcient. Nevertheless, both
are insignificant. Note that the coeﬃcients from column C stay largely constant for
both magnitude and significance, except for Directorships, which turns significant at a
10% significance level. Thus, a board on which the majority of directors hold five or
more additional directorships is associated with an increase in director compensation by
approximately 4%.
Ultimately, to complete our model specification, we include the dimension of Gender
Diversity in column E of Table 6.5. The coeﬃcients from column D stay largely constant,
but Gray Zone loses its significance, while the control variable Firm Age gains significance.
Further, the coeﬃcient of Directorships is approaching significance at the 5% significance
level. The fraction of females on the board seem to be negatively related to the level
of director compensation, although the coeﬃcient is insignificant. The last variable we
include, Female CEO, is positive and approaching significance, albeit at a 10% significance
level.
6.3 Robustness Analysis
Given the panel nature of our data, it is not plausible that the observations within one
entity over time are independent. E.g., a company’s board compensation in one year
is likely to aﬀect the level of the same company’s board compensation in the following
years. Hence, the error term is likely to be correlated with its value in the year after, i.e.,
serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2012). We perform a Breusch-Godfrey test to confirm the
existence of serial correlation in our data. Further, we document heteroskedasticity by
running a Breusch-Pagan test, and these two aspects of our data require us to calculate the
clustered standard errors, which are robust for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
(Wooldridge, 2012). In all our presented tables, we have calculated the clustered standard
errors and report corresponding t-statistics in parentheses below the coeﬃcients.
To support our analysis, we have included a table in which we contrast our model E
from Table 6.5 to other regression models. We perform additional analysis on our model
specification through the approaches of one-way fixed eﬀects (1),24 one-way fixed eﬀects
24The one-way fixed eﬀects model is often referred to as the time-fixed eﬀects model due to the
time-demeaning of the data
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with industry dummies (2), pooled OLS with year and industry dummies (3), and first
diﬀerence (4). These results are presented in Appendix A2.3.
Despite very diﬀerent methodological approaches, we seem to get considerably similar
results, providing support for our findings in the two-way fixed eﬀects model. In
the original model, we were surprised to find ROA⌧ 1 to be insignificant, while most
international research documents a positive and significant relationship. However, none of
our alternative models can document a significant eﬀect, highlighting the separation of
corporate performance and director compensation in The Norwegian Code of Practice for
Corporate Governance (The Norwegian Corporate Governance Board, 2018).
Interestingly, the Listed variable turns significant for the columns 1 to 3, which is the
eﬀect we would expect in our primary model. The reason it is insignificant for two-way
FE and FD might be that there is not enough variation within entities, i.e., not enough
companies go from unlisted to listed or listed to unlisted during the period. This is a
fallacy of the two-way fixed eﬀects model. The same reasoning goes for the coeﬃcient of
CEO Duality.
Moreover, all models exhibit a positive and significant eﬀect of Directorships on the level
of director compensation, supporting our original model. These coeﬃcients are significant
at a 1% significance level as compared to a 10% significance level of the original model.
Additionally, the Human Capital of the board turns negative and significant for columns
1 to 3. The eﬀect is, however, positive and significant under the FD approach.
In Appendix A2.4, we present an additional robustness test as we contrast our primary
model from Table 6.5 to a model specification with alternative proxies; we measure size
as the natural logarithm of assets rather than sales, Corporate Performance as last year’s
ROE rather than last year’s ROA, and risk is measured according to the SEBRA model
(Eklund et al., 2001). In the robustness test, we do not find the risk scenario, measured
using the SEBRA model, to carry any significance. This surprising finding might be
due to the much smaller fraction characterized as high-risk as opposed to the Distress
Zone. Moreover, the leverage ratio loses its significance. Considering both the lack of
significance for risk and the corresponding drop in significance for leverage, we suspect
that we might poorly estimate the SEBRA risk in our sample. The suspicion is partly
due to the complexity of the SEBRA model, making it challenging to implement. Besides
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these, the coeﬃcients stay constant concerning sign and significance. The alternative
measure of corporate performance does not yield any significant results either, providing
support to the separation of corporate performance and director compensation.
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7 Discussion
In this chapter, we will discuss our findings presented in the previous chapter and view
these in light of the theory, related literature, and hypotheses presented in the first few
chapters. We will use model E in Table 6.5 as our main empirical finding, and support
this with the other models.
7.1 Firm Characteristics
Coherent with hypothesis H1, we provide evidence of a positive relationship between
firm complexity and the level of director compensation in Norwegian companies. We
find positive and significant coeﬃcients for both the Size variable and the Distress Zone
variable. The positive eﬀect of size on director compensation is well-documented in
existing research, regardless of size measure. Consequently, this finding is not particularly
surprising. Notably, our model finds that a doubling in size would be accompanied by a
4.7% increase in board compensation, indicating a rather conservative elasticity between
the two. Regarding the relationship between risk and director compensation, however,
the reviewed literature is not uniform in its findings; Bryan et al. (2000) and Brick et al.
(2006) document a positive relationship, while Ghosh (2006) provide evidence of a negative
relationship, and the analyses of both Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Andreas et al.
(2010) yield inconclusive results. Note that these studies measured risk by market-based
measures, whereas we have used an accounting-based measure.
Thus, according to agency theory, our research implicitly suggests that agency problems
are a more significant issue in more complex business environments. Directors receive
higher compensation to mitigate agency problems when the need for monitoring, and the
diﬃculty of the directors’ responsibilities, increase. Arguably, the size of a firm might
capture the complexity aspect to a more considerable degree in normal times, but when
the risk of bankruptcy is high, it is reasonable that the tasks of the board become more
intricate.
Secondly, in H2, we hypothesized a negative relationship between a company’s leverage
ratio and the level of director compensation. In Table 6.5, we provide evidence supporting
this hypothesis in the Norwegian business environment, suggesting that agency cost is
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a function of capital structure. Thus, we endorse the debt-control hypothesis stated by
Jensen (1986), and debt seems to act as a substitute monitoring device, reducing the need
for monitoring activity from the board. This rather interesting result is supported by
Andreas et al. (2010), finding a similar negative and significant relationship for listed
German companies. Conversely, Bryan et al. (2000) and Brick et al. (2006) could not
found a significant relationship between leverage and total director compensation for US
companies.
7.2 Corporate Performance
In accordance with most previous literature, we hypothesized a positive relationship
between corporate performance and the level of director compensation in H3. The
reviewed literature is considerably uniform in its findings on a positive and significant
relationship between ROA and the level of director compensation (e.g., Brick et al., 2006;
Ghosh, 2006; Andreas et al., 2010). Only Cook et al. (2019) find no significant relationship
between the two. Hence, it is interesting that we cannot observe the same eﬀect in the
Norwegian business environment across any of our model specifications in Table 6.5 nor
in the other models in Appendix A2.3.
Albeit a surprising finding, the insignificant relationship may provide evidence of Norwegian
companies adhering to the recommendations of NUES on a strict separation of corporate
performance and director compensation. Performance-contingent bonus elements, like
stock- or option-based incentives, seem to be more common in the international setting.
7.3 Board Characteristics
In this thesis, we explore the eﬀects of board characteristics on the level of director
compensation through our variables Board Size, CEO Duality, Directorships, and Human
Capital. We hypothesized the relationship between the number of directors on the board
and the dependent variable to be negative in H4, despite Kiel and Nicholson (2003) arguing
that a larger board is beneficial from the perspectives of both agency theory as well as
resource dependence theory. We projected the mechanical eﬀect of increasing the board
size to be negative as it reduces the workload of each director for an otherwise similar
company, and confirm our hypothesis across all our analyses. Our findings are in line
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with the majority of the reviewed literature (e.g., Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Adams and
Ferreira, 2009; Andreas et al., 2010).
Conversely, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) argue that a more numerous board will increase
monitoring eﬀectiveness by having more people reviewing management actions and by
providing more resources to the board. Ghosh (2006) and Cook et al. (2019) advocate the
same view and provide evidence of this positive relationship on their studies of Indian and
US firms, respectively. Possibly, we captured the eﬀect of increased provision of resources
to the board by our Directorships dummy, and thus we find the negative mechanical eﬀect
to be prominent in our results.
In H5, we hypothesized a negative relationship between CEO duality and the level of
board compensation. While agency theory argues that the duality reduces monitoring
eﬀectiveness as the CEO monitors himself, organization theory points to the advantage of
robust and unambiguous leadership according to Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994). Most
related literature find a positive relationship, supporting the organization theory argument
(e.g. Brick et al., 2006; Ghosh, 2006; Cook et al., 2019). However, our analysis shows
that the formerly prohibited dual role of CEO and Chairperson of the board exhibits an
insignificant coeﬃcient across all specifications in Table 6.5. Thus, our regression models
provide no support for our hypothesis. This insignificant relationship may support the
abolition of the Norwegian legislation prohibiting CEO duality up until 2013 (Aksjeloven,
1997).
Our first variable originating from the resource dependence theory and proxying the
social capital of the board, Directorships, becomes significant at a 10% significance level
as we include more dimensions in Table 6.5, and the coeﬃcient is positive as posited
in H6. Cannella et al. (2009) argue that organizations value social capital because
director networks reduce uncertainty, provide access to information and opportunities,
and bring legitimacy and status to the organization. Our results provide weak evidence
that the value created exceeds the cost of having busy, overstretched directors in line
with the arguments of Bøhren and Strøm (2005). The suggestion should, however, be
interpreted critically, given the low significance level. As explained earlier, there is limited
existing literature on this relationship. Nonetheless, Andreas et al. (2010) supports this
result, finding no significant eﬀect of multiple directorships. Conversely, Belcredi and
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Bozzi (2018) documented a positive and significant relationship between the number of
directorships held and the remuneration to independent non-executive directors in Italian
listed companies. Further, we believe this relationship is likely to be more extensively
researched in the future.
Our second variable originating from the resource dependence theory, director age, is
proxying the Human Capital of the board. This human capital variable is intended to
capture the level of expertise possessed by the directors. NUES explicitly states that
director compensation should reflect the director’s expertise. However, controlling for the
other dimensions, we observe a scarcely positive and insignificant coeﬃcient for all columns
of Table 6.5. Conversely, Cook et al. (2019) finds a positive and significant relationship
between average age and the level of director compensation in the US. Measuring human
capital as the average age of the board is admittedly a weak measure of human capital,
reflected in the negligible eﬀect on the level of board compensation.
7.4 Ownership Structure
We measure ownership structure both through ownership concentration and whether or
not the company is listed on a stock exchange. We expected the relationship between
ownership concentration and director compensation to be negative in H8, following the
arguments of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggesting that the same owner bears the costs
and benefits of monitoring to a greater degree as the ownership concentration increases.
However, we find both measures to have an insignificant eﬀect on the level of director
compensation in Table 6.5, suggesting that the level of director compensation is not very
sensitive to the ownership structure of the company.
The insignificant relationship between ownership concentration and the level of director
compensation is somewhat surprising, given the uniform findings in the related literature.
Both Elston and Goldberg (2003) and Andreas et al. (2010) detect a negative relationship
for German companies, suggesting that more concentrated owners eﬀectively act as
monitors themselves. Our findings, however, suggest that the level of board compensation
is unaﬀected by the ownership concentration. This may indicate a greater separation
of ownership and control in the Norwegian business environment compared to the
environments studied in the related literature. However, more extensive research is
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required before drawing any conclusions.
Further, unlike Gogineni et al. (2013), we find no significant relationship between the level
of director compensation and if the company is listed or not. One might argue that a listed
company is larger in general and, on average, has more dispersed ownership than a private
company, and thus that these eﬀects will be mixed up. However, running the regression
with only one of the Ownership Structure variables does not aﬀect the magnitude of the
coeﬃcient nor its significance.
Moreover, as discussed in Section 4.1.2, information on the ownership of shares in the
company by the board members would extend this dimension. Following the arguments of
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), the persons bearing the benefits and costs of monitoring would
also be responsible for the monitoring. I.e., in the case where board members own a large
share of the company, they would be highly incentivized to perform vigilant monitoring.
7.5 Gender Diversity
In hypothesis H9, we posited a negative relationship between the variables proxying
Gender Diversity on both management- and board level. Both Cook et al. (2019) and
Andreas et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between the number of female directors
and the level of director compensation, suggesting that gender-diverse boards are tougher
monitors. Surprisingly, we do not find any significant relationship between the level of
director compensation and our gender-diversity variables.
Although Adams and Ferreira (2009) found gender-diverse boards to be tougher monitors,
with an entailing higher compensation, we do not seem to be able to detect this eﬀect in the
Norwegian setting. However, the Norwegian environment provides a natural experiment
on the eﬀect of gender diversity on the board with the introduction of a gender quota on
the boards of listed companies in 2008.
In Appendix A2.5, we present the results of a pooled OLS regression on the listed companies
before and after the introduction of a gender quota on the boards. Given the short period
before introduction, we have too few firm-year observations for an FE model to make
sense, but we believe that a pooled OLS will highlight the eﬀect of gender diversity. The
Norwegian Act on Public Limited Companies requires both genders to be represented by
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at least 40% after January 2008 (Allmennaksjeloven, 1997), and therefore we divide the
sample into two periods: 2004-2007 and 2008-2016. Note the considerable change in point
of reference, from a mean fraction of approximately 25% before the introduction - as the
companies started increasing its share after the introduction in 2006 - to a mandatory
minimum of 40% in January 2008.
In the first period, the Fraction of Female Directors coeﬃcient exhibits a positive and
significant relationship with the level of director compensation. However, the coeﬃcient
loses its significance in the period following the new legislation, suggesting that the fraction
of female directors does not aﬀect the level of director compensation in the Norwegian
business environment.
Adams and Ferreira (2009) concluded that more gender-diverse boards were beneficial to
companies with otherwise weak governance, but that it might lead to over-monitoring
in already well-governed firms. Our finding supports this conclusion in the way that the
company is able to extract the positive eﬀect of gender diversity at a lower reference point.
After the introduction, the board is almost as gender diverse as possible; hence there is
no such eﬀect to be extracted.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to answer the research question What determines the
level of director compensation in Norwegian companies? We show how the compensation
to the board has developed from 2004 to 2016, and explore various aspects of the company
and its board aﬀecting the level of director compensation. The establishment of an
eﬀective board of directors is key to a company’s success. The board shall appoint and
monitor the company’s management, and hence, they play a crucial role in attracting the
best talent as well as to remove the directors if they underperform. In this thesis, we have
attempted to shed light on which facets of a company might aﬀect the compensation of the
individuals taking on the role of director in the Norwegian business setting. We analyze a
comprehensive data set of all financial statements submitted to Norwegian authorities
between 2004 and 2016. By adopting a fixed-eﬀects approach, we successfully capture all
firm-specific eﬀects.
8.1 Key Findings
We find that the mean director compensation of our sample grows at a CAGR of 5.4%
from 2004 to 2016, while the standard deviation more than doubles over the same period.
Moreover, companies operating in the Oﬀshore/Shipping sector remunerate their directors
by approximately 25% more than the mean compensation. On the other end of the scale,
we find that director compensation within the Telecom/IT/Tech sector is approximately
10% below the sample mean.
Our two-way fixed eﬀects model provides evidence of a relationship between firm
characteristics and the level of director compensation. A firm’s complexity, proxied
by size and risk, exhibits a positive coeﬃcient, implying that the larger the responsibilities
of the director, the higher is his remuneration. The leverage ratio of the firm has the
opposite eﬀect on compensation, highlighting the disciplinary eﬀect of debt.
Moreover, the level of director compensation is aﬀected by the characteristics of the
board. For an increasing number of directors, we find compensation for each director
to be decreasing. This inverse relationship follows the same logic as for firm complexity
- the responsibility of each director is reduced as more directors monitor the company
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and, consequently, the compensation per director decreases. Interestingly, we provide
novel evidence of a positive eﬀect of information sharing between companies through
interlocking directorships. This finding bolsters the resource dependence theory, viewing
the board as a provider of both human and social capital.
However, we do not find any evidence of the level of director compensation in Norwegian
companies over the period to be related to corporate performance. Although a surprising
finding, given the internationally documented relationship, it is in line with Norwegian
recommendations of separation of corporate performance and board compensation. Lastly,
we do not detect any significant relationships between director compensation and various
measures of a company’s ownership structure and gender diversity.
8.2 Suggestions for Future Research
There are several ways to undertake an extension of our study. The most obvious
suggestion for future research would be to focus solely on companies listed on the Oslo
Stock Exchange. Due to the listed nature of these companies, regulations require them to
provide more detailed financial statements in their annual report, enabling the analysis
of chairperson compensation versus board member compensation. It is also likely that
they will provide a more detailed view of the nature of compensation, and whether or not
the board members own stocks in the company. It would be particularly interesting to
examine this latter eﬀect on monitoring eﬀectiveness and, in turn, director compensation.
Moreover, studying listed companies carries the benefit of access to market values, which
may yield other results than we find using book values.
Furthermore, a similar study could include the aspect of CEO compensation as there are
several advocates of remunerating the chairperson as a fraction of the CEO compensation,
perhaps based on the FTE percentage. It would also be interesting to analyze the people
holding the positions of directors in more detail. An example could be to employ fixed
eﬀects on individuals and thus taking into account the individual traits and characteristics
of the director. Some directors are likely to have a good reputation and consequently be
in high demand, thus driving their compensation up.
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Appendix
A1 Figures
Figure A1.1: Variable Distribution
Appendix A1.1 presents histograms, normal fits and density distributions for the variables used in the
analysis. Board compensation, Revenue, Firm Age and Board Size have been log-transformed to reduce
skewness.
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Figure A1.2: Director Compensation per Sector (2016 kNOK)
Figure A1.3: Director Compensation per Region (2016 kNOK)
Appendix A1.2 and A1.3 present the distribution of board compensation per sector and region, respectively.
The bar ranges between the upper and lower quartile and includes the median and mean values of the
distributions. The median is the leftmost vertical solid line and the mean is the rightmost vertical solid
line within the interquartile range. The red and blue vertical dotted lines present the sample median and
mean, respectively.
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Table A2.1: Definition of Variables
Variable name Definition Source
Dependent Variable
BoardComp Natural logarithm of average comp. per director(ln(board comp. / # board members) SNF
Independent Variables
A - Firm Characteristics
Size Measure of firm size: ln(total revenue) SNF
Altman’s Z-Score
(Altman, 2002) 6.56 ⇥
Working Capital
Assets
+ 3.26⇥ RetainedEarnings
Assets
+ 6.72⇥ EBIT
Assets
+ 1.05⇥ Equity
Debt
SNF
Gray Zone Z-Score 2 [1.10, 2.60] SNF
Distress Zone Z-Score <1.10 SNF
Leverage Leverage metric: total debt to total assets SNF
Firm Age Natural logarithm of years since establishment of firm SNF
B - Corporate Performance
ROA⌧ 1
Profitability measure: net income before
extraordinary items to total assets in the previous year SNF
C - Board Characteristics
Board Size Natural logarithm of number of board members SNF
CEO Duality (0, 1) Dummy variable equalling 1 if the CEO also chairsthe board
Board
Data
Directorships (0, 1) Dummy variable equalling 1 if the majority of theboard hold five or more additional directorships
Board
Data
Human Capital Average age of the board members BoardData
D - Ownership Structure
Ownership
Concentration
Herfindahl/Hirschman Index (HHI) measuring the
concentration of the firm’s stockholders SNF
Listed (0, 1) Dummy variable equalling 1 if the company islisted on Oslo Stock Exchange SNF
E - Gender Diversity
Fraction of Female
Directors
Ratio of females on the board to number
of board members SNF
Female CEO Dummy variable equalling 1 if the CEO is female SNF
Appendix A2.1 presents the variables used in the research model. The table presents names, definitions
and sources.
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Table A2.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables for the 1,404,069
Observations Removed due to the NOK 30,000 Compensation Requirement
N Mean St.Dev. p25 Median p75
Firm Characteristics
Revenue (kNOK) 1,404,069 13,776 382,838 86 1,121 4,593
Assets (kNOK) 1,404,069 19,510 530,981 657 2,106 6,120
Risk
Safe Zone 1,404,069 0.531 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
Gray Zone 1,404,069 0.132 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000
Distress Zone 1,404,069 0.337 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000
Leverage 1,404,069 2.770 102.518 0.353 0.673 0.897
Firm Age 1,404,069 10.844 12.392 3.000 7.000 15.000
Firm Performance
ROA 1,404,069 -0.335 24.695 -0.030 0.030 0.139
Board Characteristics
Board Size 1,404,069 1.985 1.259 1.000 1.000 3.000
CEO Duality 1,404,069 0.531 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
Busy Boards 1,404,069 0.140 0.347 0.000 0.000 0.000
Human Capital 1,404,069 50.066 10.277 43.000 50.000 99.000
Ownership Structure
Ownership
Concentration 1,388,517 0.681 0.306 0.445 0.556 1.000
Listed 1,404,069 0.0004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gender Diversity
Fraction of
Female Directors 1,404,069 0.164 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.300
Female CEO 1,166,246 0.144 0.351 0.000 0.000 0.000
Appendix A2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables on the observations removed
due to the requirement of minimum NOK 30,000 director compensation(Table 4.1)
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Table A2.3: Determinants of Director Compensation under various models
Dependent Variable Natural Logarithm of Total Compensation per Director
Model E (1) (2) (3) (4)
A - Firm Characteristics
Size 0.048***(4.639)
0.094***
(10.302)
0.101***
(10.518)
0.105***
(10.838)
0.039***
(4.404)
Risk
Gray Zone 0.029(1.340)
0.054*
(1.653)
0.034
(1.040)
0.033
(1.058)
0.025
(1.542)
Distress Zone 0.071**(2.319
0.166***
(4.220)
0.143***
(3.671)
0.130***
(3.559)
0.076***
(3.084)
Leverage -0.155**(-2.167)
-0.313***
(-4.274)
-0.301***
(-4.159)
-0.131***
(-4.861)
-0.021
(-1.014)
Firm Age -0.084*(-1.937)
-0.005
(-0.244)
-0.003
(-0.136)
-0.003
(-0.147) N/A
B - Corporate Performance
ROA⌧ 1
0.031
(0.513)
-0.071
(-0.980)
-0.092
(-1.268)
-0.083
(-1.149)
0.055
(1.374)
C - Board Characteristics
Board Size -0.533***(-8.916)
-0.421***
(-10.623)
-0.438***
(-10.968)
-0.442***
(-11.145)
-0.632***
(-12.602)
CEO Duality (0, 1) -0.036(-0.683)
0.085*
(1.937)
0.079*
(1.789)
0.078*
(1.779)
-0.006
(-0.145)
Directorships (0, 1) 0.050*(1.867)
0.085***
(2.847)
0.066**
(2.261)
0.061***
(2.109)
0.059***
(3.178)
Human Capital 0.004(1.224)
-0.007***
(-3.551)
-0.008***
(-3.786)
-0.008***
(-3.815)
0.006**
(2.275)
D - Ownership Structure
Ownership
Concentration
-0.071
(-0.439)
0.010
(0.142)
-0.005
(-0.077)
-0.007
(-0.100)
-0.144
(-1.528)
Listed (0, 1) 0.340(1.469)
0.805***
(11.595)
0.781***
(10.618)
0.781***
(10.697)
0.236
(1.484)
E - Gender Diversity
Fraction of Female
Directors
-0.092
(-0.930)
0.012
(0.169)
-0.002
(-0.257)
-0.005
(-0.071)
-0.023
(-0.269)
Female CEO (0, 1) 0.088(1.585)
-0.047
(-1.072)
-0.056
(-1.282)
-0.053
(-1.215)
0.098***
(2.649)
Intercept 3.927***(24.153)
0.022***
(5.297)
Firm FEs Yes No No No Yes
Time FEs /dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes No
Rsquared 0.069 0.243 0.251 0.268 0.069
Model F-Test 16.512*** 116.214*** 80.811*** 57.987*** 17.804***
Observations 5,106 5,106 5,106 5,106 3,149
Appendix A2.3 shows our model specification from column E in Table 6.5 contrasted to the one-way fixed
eﬀects, one-way fixed eﬀects with industry dummies, pooled OLS with year and industry dummies, and
first-diﬀerence coeﬃcients in column (1), (2), (3) and (4), respectively. Below the coeﬃcient estimates, we
present t-statistics based on clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A2.1
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
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Table A2.4: Robustness test of FE model
Dependent Variable Natural Logarithm of Total Compensation per Director
Model Standard Alternative
A - Firm Characteristics
Size as ln(Revenue) 0.048***(4.639) Size as ln(Assets)
0.097***
(3.552)
Risk Risk
Gray Zone 0.029(1.340) SEBRA
-0.025
(-0.944)
Distress Zone 0.071**(2.319)
Leverage -0.155**(-2.167) Leverage
-0.055
(-0.786)
Firm Age -0.084*(-1.937) Firm Age
-0.081*
(-1.811)
B - Corporate Performance
ROA⌧ 1
0.031
(0.513) ROE⌧ 1
0.001
(0.562)
C - Board Characteristics
Board Size -0.533***(-8.916) Board Size
-0.549***
(-9.278)
CEO Duality (0, 1) -0.035(-0.683) CEO Duality (0, 1)
-0.042
(-0.807)
Busy Board (0, 1) 0.050*(1.867) Busy Board (0, 1)
0.046*
(1.760)
Human Capital 0.004(1.224) Human Capital
0.005
(1.543)
D - Ownership Structure
Ownership Concentration -0.071(-0.439) Ownership Concentration
-0.074
(-0.444)
Listed (0, 1) 0.340(1.469) Listed (0, 1)
0.313
(1.412)
E - Gender Diversity
Fraction of Female
Directors
-0.092
(-0.930)
Fraction of Female
Directors
-0.099
(-1.014)
Female CEO (0, 1) 0.088(1.585) Female CEO (0, 1)
0.089
(1.606)
Rsquared 0.069 Rsquared 0.067
Model F-Test 16.512*** Model F-Test 17.276***
Observations 5,106 Observations 5,106
Appendix A2.4 shows our model specification from column E in Table 6.5 contrasted to the same FE
model but with company size measured as ln(Assets), Risk measured by the SEBRA model, and corporate
performance measured as the logarithm of last year’s ROE. Below the coeﬃcient estimates, we present
t-statistics based on clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A2.1.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
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Table A2.5: Pooled OLS of listed companies before and after introduction of gender
quota on boards
Dependent Variable Natural Logarithm of Total Compensation per Director
Period of analysis Year 2004-2007 Year 2008-2016
A - Firm Characteristics
Size 0.220***(6.078)
0.112***
(2.792)
Risk
Gray Zone 0.375*(1.914)
0.030
(0.209)
Distress Zone 0.206(1.067)
0.263*
(1.871)
Leverage -1.352***(-3.218)
-0.460
(-1.565)
Firm Age -0.117(-1.651)
0.025
(0.345)
B - Corporate Performance
ROA⌧ 1
-0.685**
(-2.003)
-0.664**
(-2.336)
C - Board Characteristics
Board Size -0.761***(-3.540)
-0.304
(-1.016)
CEO Duality (0, 1) N/A -0.033(-0.118)
Busy Board (0, 1) 0.059(0.493)
0.125
(1.269)
Human Capital 0.036**(2.288)
0.012
(1.105)
D - Ownership Structure
Ownership
Concentration
-0.368
(-0.431)
0.024
(0.038)
E - Gender Diversity
Fraction of Female
Directors
1.081***
(2.927)
-0.074
(-0.098)
Female CEO (0, 1) 0.537**(2.239)
0.010
(0.065)
Intercept 2.308**(2.305)
3.606***
(3.821)
Rsquared 0.483 0.116
Model F-Test 5.440*** 2.463***
Observations 83 257
Appendix A2.5 describes the coeﬃcients of a pooled OLS regression of the natural logarithm
of compensation per director against our predicted determinants for year 2004 to 2007 and 2008 to 2016.
Below the coeﬃcient estimates, we present t-statistics based on clustered standard errors. Variable
definitions are provided in Appendix A2.1.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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A3 Summary of Related Literature
Table A3.1: Summary of Related Literature
Author,
Country
and Year
Data and
Methodology
Dependent
Variable(s)
Determinants
Independent
Variables
Results
Conyon 213 Large   Ln(Top Director Firm   Ln(Sales(t)) Firm size and director compensation are positively related.
UK Firms Compensation) Characteristics
United The analysis shows that current-dated returns are positively
Kingdom 1988 - 1993 Corporate Shareholder Return(t) related to director’s pay. Pre-dated returns indicate a negative,
Performance Shareholder Return(t-1) yet insignificant, relationship with director compensation.
1997 First Relative Performance(t) The relative performance measure appears to be less important
Diﬀerence Relative Performance(t-1) and yields a negative, but insignificant, relation with total
director compensation in most equations.
Corporate   Ln(Salary + Bonus)(t-1)
Governance   Remuneration Committee Director compensation is positively related to last period’s
  Separate Chair and CEO compensation. Companies that have introduced remuneration
  Rem. Comm. x Return(t) committees have lower rates of growth in top director pay.
  Chair / CEO x Return(t)
Separation of the CEO and chairman role has no eﬀect on
top director pay.
Bryan, 1,700 U.S. Log(Total Firm Market-to-Book Ratio The analysis finds that total compensation is positively
Hwang Firms Compensation) Characteristics Leverage related to the firm’s growth opportunities, size, return, beta,
Klein and Ln(Firm Value) and takeover threat.
Lillien 1992 - 1997 Ln(# of Segments)
Regulation Dummy Total compensation is negatively related to the number of
United OLS Takeover Threat business segments and degree of regulation.
States Return
Beta The study finds no significant relationship between total
2000 compensation and leverage.
Ownership Ln(Managerial Ownership)
Structure Ln(Institutional Ownership) Increased managerial ownership reduces total compensation.
Increased institutional ownership increases total compensation.
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Table A3.1 continued from previous page
Author,
Country
and Year
Data and
Methodology
Dependent
Variable(s)
Determinants
Independent
Variables
Results
Brick, S&P 1000 Ln(Total Director Firm Tobin’s Q (t-1) The results indicate that total director compensation is
Palmond Compensation) Characteristics Log (Sales (t-1)) positively related to tobin’s Q, ROA, stock returns, firm size,
and Wald 1992 - 2001 Log (Employees (t-1)) intangible assets (measured by R&D expenses), and stock
ROA (t-1) volatility.
United Pooled OLS Mean ROA (t-1, t-3)
States Fixed Eﬀects Stock Return (t-1, t-3) The analysis finds no significant correlation between total
Cash Flow Risk director compensation and the firm’s leverage ratio.
2006 Stock Volatility
R&D (t-1) / Assets (t-1) Concerning the CEO characteristics, the regression
Advertising (t-1) / Assets (t-1) indicates a positive relationship with CEO gender and a negative
Debt (t-1) / Assets (t-1) relationship with the percentage of equity owned by the CEO.
PP&E (t-1) / Assets (t-1) No significant results are found for CEO experience.
Investments (t-1) / Assets (t-1)
Total director compensation is positively related to CEO duality
CEO CEO Gender and the number of board meetings.
Characteristics CEO Experience
Governance % of equity owned by CEO
Characteristics CEO Duality
Internal CEO
Number of Board Meetings
Elston & 91 German Ln (Total Firm ROE The analysis concludes that ROE and sales have a positive
Goldberg Industrial Compensation) Performance relation to board compensation. Bank influence is negatively
Corporations associated with director compensation.
Germany quoted on Firm Sales
the German Characteristics Bank Influence Greater ownership control leads to lower director compensation.
2003 Stock Director compensation is also negatively related to having
Exchange Ownership Concentration [2 - 5] foreign, firm, bank or family blockholders.
Structure Firm Ownership
1970 - 1986 Foreign Ownership
Bank Ownership
Fixed Eﬀects Family Ownership
GMM IV
76
A
3
Sum
m
ary
ofR
elated
Literature
Table A3.1 continued from previous page
Author,
Country
and Year
Data and
Methodology
Dependent
Variable(s)
Determinants
Independent
Variables
Results
Ryan & 1,018 firms Ln(Total Firm Ln (Assets) The results indicate that total compensation is reduced if the
Wiggins from S&P 500, Compensation) Characteristics Market-to-Book Ratio CEO has managerial power over the board and if the board
MidCap 400 & lacks independence.
United SmallCap 600 Board Ln (Number of Directors)
States Characteristics Percentage of Inside Directors Further, the results indicate that that total compensation is
1997 negatively related to board size and CEO tenure.
2004 CEO Ln (CEO Tenure)
OLS Characteristics CEO Duality The CEO duality coeﬃcient indicates an inconclusive and
Founding Family CEO insignificant relationship with total compensation.
Firm Adj. 3-year stock return The analysis also finds that larger firms, firms with more
Performance Adj. 3-year CFROA investment opportunities, and family-controlled firms pay
pay directors a higher compensation.
Linn & 200 Largest Ln(Total Director Investment Aggregated IOS: The main findings show that firms with more investment
Park U.S. Firms Compensation) Opportunities • Capex (t-1, t-3) + opportunities pay a higher level of compensation to their
+ R&D (t-1, t-3) outside directors than firms with fewer investment opportunities.
United 1996 - 2001 + Acquisitions (t-1, t-3)
States / Depreciation (t-1, t-3) Total outside director compensation is increasing with total size.
Pooled OLS • Geometric mean annual This relationship is positive regardless of what measure of size
2005 Fixed Eﬀects growth rate of market value you use.
of assets
• R&D (t-1) / BV Assets (t-1)
• Market Value Assets (t - 1) /
Book Value Assets (t-1)
Firm Ln (Assets (t-1))
Characteristics Ln (Sales (t-1))
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Table A3.1 continued from previous page
Author,
Country
and Year
Data and
Methodology
Dependent
Variable(s)
Determinants
Independent
Variables
Results
Ghosh 462 Indian Ln (Board Firm ROA ROA has a positive and significant relationship to total board
Manufacturing Compensation) Performance Adj. Tobin’s Q compensation. The analysis finds no significant relationship
India Firms Risk between Tobin’s Q and compensation. Risk is negatively
related to total compensation.
2006 1997 - 2002 Internal Board Size
Monitoring Proportion of NED Board compensation is positively related to board size and CEO
Fixed Eﬀects CEO Duality duality. As the proportion of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs)
CEO related to firm founder increases, board compensation decreases.
More than one CEO
Board compensation increases if the CEO is related to the
Firm Diversification founder of the firm and if there is more than one CEO.
Characteristics Ln (Sales)
Advertisement-to-Sales The analysis shows that business diversification, advertisement
R&D-to-Sales intensity, R&D intensity and sales are positively related to
Firm Age board compensation. There is no significant relationship between
Subsidiary firm age and board compensation. Firms belonging to a business
group pay less total compensation.
Adams & S&P 500, Ln (Total Director Firm Log (Sales) The results show that total director compensation is positively
Ferreira MidCap & Compensation) Characteristics # of Business Segments related to size, Tobin’s Q and ROA. On the other hand, it is
SmallCap Tobin’s Q negatively related to the diversification proxy. The risk variable
United ROA yields inconclusive results.
States 1996 - 2003 Volatility
For board characteristics, the regression suggests that the fraction
2009 Pooled OLS Board Board Size of female directors and the fraction of independent directors are
Fixed Eﬀects Characteristics % of Independent Directors positively correlated with total compensation. However, the
% of Female Directors fraction of female directors is only significant at a 10%
significant level.
Board size is negatively related to total director compensation.
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Table A3.1 continued from previous page
Author,
Country
and Year
Data and
Methodology
Dependent
Variable(s)
Determinants
Independent
Variables
Results
Andreas, Listed German Ln (Average Firm Ln (Total Assets) The results indicate that director compensation is positively
Rapp & Prime Standard Compensation Characteristics Total Debt / Total Capital related to size and free cash flow. Leverage is negatively
Wolﬀ Firms per Director) Free Cash Flow Proxy related to director compensation. Investment opportunities,
Market-to-Book risk and competition do no yield any significant results.
Germany 2005 - 2008 Volatility
Competition Dividend yield, ROA and ROIC are positively related to director
2010 Random & compensation. In addition, the analysis yields no significant
Fixed Eﬀects Corporate Total Shareholder Return results for total shareholder return.
Performance Dividend Yield
ROA Ownership concentration, management ownership and external
ROIC blockholders are negatively related to board compensation.
Further, the analysis finds no significant results for the
Ownership Ownership Concentration relationship between institutional investors and compensation.
Structure Management Ownership
External Blockholders The number of meetings and professional directors are
Institutional positively related to director compensation, while increased board
size seems to reduce compensation. The analysis finds no
Board Board Size significant coeﬃcients for the directorships or chairman
Characteristics Directorships independence variables.
Number of Board Meetings
Chairman Independence
Professional Directors
Cook, 3,881 firm- Ln (Total Gender Gender (Women = 1) Total compensation is positively related to size, the number of
Ingersoll year obs. for Compensation) Diversity # of Female Directors directors, CEO duality, executive director and executive age.
& Glass S&P 500 firms # of Women on CC Firm performance is negatively related to total compensation in
Women as Chair of CC one of the three regression models.
United 2009 - 2013 Female CEO
States The analysis suggests that total compensation has no significant
GEE Control Year Trend relationship with gender or with the number of women on the
2019 Variables Ln (Employees) compensation committee (CC). The number of female directors
ROA is marginally significant and positively related to total
Board Size compensation.
CEO Duality
Executive Director If the chair of the compensation committee is female, total
Executive Tenure compensation decreases. The conclusion is only significant for
Executive Age one of the three regression models. There is no significant
Ranking of Job Categories relationship between having a female CEO and compensation.
